The paper presented here is adopted from a keynote address presented by Dr. Koenigsberg at the United World College of the American West. In his 1996 declaration of war, Bin Laden said of his followers: “These youths love death as you love life.” He explained that his youths are “different from your soldiers.” Your problem will be how to “convince your troops to fight” while our problem will be how to “restrain our youths to wait for their turn in fighting.” Bin Laden felt that his people were superior to Americans because his young followers were willing to die for a cause, whereas young Americans were weak: unwilling to sacrifice their lives. From Bin Laden’s perspective, American culture was inferior—because its people possessed no sacred ideals for which they were willing to die or kill.

By the mid-1990s, the United States had evolved what I call a “counter-sacrificial culture.” Americans no longer believed that there was anything worth killing or dying for. Military scholars wrote on the policy of “casualty aversion” (see Hyde, 2000 and Townsend, 2000). Prior to 9/11, it seemed that the United States was unwilling to send troops into battle if there was a possibility that even a few soldiers might be killed.

Jacob Weisberg noted in his October 1994 article in Newsweek—while the invasion of Haiti was being considered—that only about 400 U.S. soldiers had been killed in action in the 20 years since the end of the Vietnam War. Serving in the armed forces was a relatively safe job: driving a truck was three times riskier than being in the military; driving a taxi six times.

On the eve of an invasion that did not happen, Richard Cheney appeared on Meet the Press and said that Haiti was “not worth American lives.” Senator John Glenn stated that the case for intervention could not pass the “Dover Test”—the televised return of body bags from Port-au-Prince to the Air Force base in Dover, Delaware.

Writing in the New York Times on July 16, 1995, Roger Cohen suggested that unwillingness to intervene in Bosnia spelled the “death of Western honor.” Eric Gans noted on June 26, 1999, that the model of heroism constituted by the sacrifice of the individual life for the sake of the collective was “rapidly losing its viability.”

Many political observers trace the American policy of casualty aversion to what occurred in Mogadishu in October 1993 when the United States withdrew from Somalia after 19 American soldiers were killed in battle. Bin Laden was aware of what had occurred and wrote about this event in his 1996 Declaration of War against the Americans.

He taunted Defense Secretary William Perry, calling Somalia the United States’ “most disgraceful case.” After American propaganda about her power, Bin Laden wrote, one pilot was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu and the United States left the area, carrying “disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you.”

Clinton’s threats, Bin Laden said, were merely a “preparation for withdrawal.” Bin Laden concluded by addressing the United States with a statement widely quoted by commentators and politicians—among them George Bush—in the aftermath of 9/11: “You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew; the extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear.”

Mark Bowden (in Atlantic Monthly, 2002) wrote about Saddam Hussein’s plans for the 1991 Gulf War. Several weeks before the American offensive, Hussein proposed to his generals that Iraq would capture U.S. soldiers, tie them to Iraqi tanks and use them as human shields. Hussein claimed triumphantly, “The Americans will never fire on their own soldiers,” as if such squeamishness was a fatal flaw. He insisted to his Generals: “Our forces will put up more of a fight than you think.”

There would be many casualties on both sides. However, Hussein said, “Only we are willing to accept casualties; Americans are not.” He concluded: “The American people are weak. They will not accept the loss of large numbers of their soldiers.” Saddam Hussein equated political weakness with a nation’s unwillingness to sacrifice its soldiers. He felt that he and his people were superior: Iraqis were willing to sacrifice lives for their nation, whereas Americans were not.

In his Inaugural Address (January 20, 1961), John F. Kennedy said, “Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.” In subsequent years—prior to September 11—politicians rarely asked the American people to embrace sacrifice. The United States evolved into a nation focused upon personal gratification and material gain. Christopher Lasch’s book published in 1979, The Culture of Narcissism, identified this cultural trend.

In his 1996 declaration of war, Bin Laden said of his followers: “These youths love death as you love life.” He explained that his youths are “different from your soldiers.” Your problem, Bin Laden said, will be how to “convince your troops to fight” while our problem will be how to “restrain our youths to wait for their turn in fighting.”

Bin Laden, like Saddam Hussein, felt that his people were superior to Americans because his young followers were willing to die for a cause, whereas young Americans were weak: unwilling to sacrifice their lives. From Bin Laden’s perspective, American culture was inferior—because its people possessed no sacred ideals for which they were willing to die or kill.