War and Nationalism

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Abstract

This article explores the relationship between war and nationalism as it developed since the French revolution and the French revolutionary wars from the perspective of international political history. It shows how nationalism as a modern ideology changed the essence of warfare, while the relationship grew in intensity in the long gestation from the Napoleonic campaigns to World War I, reaching its peak in the heydays of totalitarianism between World War I and World War II. Totalitarianism is largely seen as an attempt to preserve the state’s radical control over its citizens achieved under war conditions.

The postwar order created the conditions and the institutions for severing the symbiotic relationship between war and nationalism by focusing on interdependence, human rights, etc. However, the excesses of neoliberal globalization have curtailed the representativeness of political institutions, while fomenting instability, which may lead to a new assertion of nationalist conflicts and war. Finally, our traditional notions of war, nations, and nationalism are likely to change when dealing with the catastrophic impact of environmental degradation.

Introduction

While organized warfare has been taking place at least since the Bronze Age (Eckhardt, 1992: 170), nationalism is an entirely modern phenomenon, which can be ascribed back to the French Revolution (1789–99) and, occasionally, to the English Civil War (1642–51), and the American declaration of independence (1776). Because of their impact on both political legitimacy and warfare, the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802) are the most clearly identifiable chain of events inaugurating the ‘special relationship’ between war and nationalism as it shaped the development of the Western system of nation-states. In particular, Paris’ introduction of the levée en masse (a term combining the meanings of ‘uprising’ and ‘levy’) on 16 August 1793 established mass conscription in the defense of the nation as a military model then widely emulated. Despite its uneven spreading, the industrial revolution also contributed to both warfare and nationalism, although the latter often proliferated among elites well before they embraced industrialism.

This article identifies the peak of this relationship in the period between 1789 and 1945, to which most space is therefore dedicated. The last sections briefly discuss both postwar developments and the coming challenges to this relationship.

From the French Revolution to the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Campaigns (1789–1915)

As the French revolution degenerated onto a factional bloodbath, appeals to unity became nearly inescapable among ruling elites and quarrelsome Jacobins. After France entered into war (1792), a deeper cycle of conflicts began, so that international violence, rather than revolutionary violence, became the main unitary catalyst. According to the historian David A. Bell, the Battle of Valmy (20 September 1792) saw the first army in human history inspired by nationalism, as throngs of soldiers immolated themselves to shouts of ‘Vive la Nation!’ (Bell, 2008). Although victory was made possible by casual events such as bad weather, Jacobin propaganda promptly seized Valmy as a foundational myth, unleashing waves of enthusiasm and the belief that fighting in the name of ‘freedom’ would grant soldiers a sort of immortality and even invincibility. Bell identifies this as the ‘first total war,’ a concept usually associated with the trenches and the ‘human waves’ attacks of World War I, but already detectable with the notion of guerre à outrance emerged during the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71). At Valmy, for the first time, the sheer number of men ready to sacrifice themselves on the front line became decisive. The unprecedented ‘enthusiasm’ for mass death was only made possible by the Parisian elites’ coherent effort to channel popular emotions by appealing to nationhood and patriotism as an organizing ideology. Despite, and possibly because of, fratricidal struggles among revolutionary elites, populism and patriotism were shared across the political–ideological spectrum. Thus, the first total war was also the first ideological war and the first nationalist war. It provided a further foundational myth to the first modern nation-state with the triumph of a new ideology linked to (positivistic) ideas of modernity and progress.

From July 1791, even before the war began, to July 1794, the French army became the target of a strenuous propaganda effort, with 7 million copies of various revolutionary journals distributed among high- and low-rank soldiers, although most of them could hardly read or write (Lynn, 1996). Mobilized around the sacred defense of La Patrie (the Mother/Fatherland), soldiers were hailed as the supreme expression of ‘collective will,’ while war was described as the finest of national virtues. Before the levée, volunteers were drafted in through an array of visual effects and media grandeur, often surrounded by a festival atmosphere punctuated by martial music. For urban elites, mass conscription became de facto a nation-building device insofar as nationalism could emerge as the broader interclass ideology suitable to mobilize and control a largely rural population. The first mass army depended ultimately upon a political revolution whose ideology, redolent of
nationalism, stressed the equality and community of all Frenchmen” (Posen, 1993: 83).

The emphasis on patriotic unity concealed and embellished deep ideological cleavages. This is how nationalism sprouted like a *deus ex machina*, providing the decisive strategic advantage and the common denominator of all ideological forces competing to act in the name of the Republic. Through war mobilization, Parisian riotous elites achieved unified support for what had become one of the most fragmented, ideologically splintered, and identity-fractured countries in Europe. For instance, insofar as he did not control the National Convention and the Committee of Public Safety, Maximilien Robespierre (1758–94) was opposed to war, which he intuitively felt as a potential distractive device through which ‘antirevolutionary’ forces could seize power (Robespierre, 2007: 30; Scutt, 2006). However, once in full control, he did not hesitate to pursue war further to consolidate his own supremacy. By merging culture, ideology, terror, and war at once, nationalism offered an impromptu combination of consensus and coercion, ‘spontaneous’ peer pressure and hetero-directed state repression. Although the Reign of Terror’s bloodbath reached its peak after November 1793, when the threat of foreign invasion had receded, war abroad coincided with a dramatic increase in repression at home: systematic mass killing by government troops led some historians to identify the *Vendée* massacres (1793–96) as the first modern genocide (Jones, 2010: 6–7; Levene, 2008; Secher, 2003). The ‘eliminationist’ pattern was replicated, expanded, and ‘refined’ in other provinces and cities, like Brittany and Lyon. Together with the remoteness of the ‘punished’ regions, war provided the most suitable cover to carry out ominous crimes and abuses, which were hardly conceivable in pace times and in more dense urban setting.

The Napoleonic campaigns (1803–15) are sometimes seen as a continuation of the French Revolutionary Wars, but had an even more direct impact on the spread of nationalism while reinforcing its links with warfare: Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasions not only created throughout Europe ‘proto-national’ institutions, which served as embryos for nascent nation-states, they also spawned unprecedented nationalist reactions against French occupation troops, like in Germany, Russia, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (Esdaille, 2004). The invasions inaugurated and fomented a downward spiral of intensifying aggressiveness, and a Darwinian race for the ‘survival of the fittest,’ so that a nation’s continued existence seemed to be inseparable from expanding state power and strengthening its industrial and military apparatus. In turn, hostilities invoked increasing responses from the enemy, typically embossed by modernist and technocratic justifications.

**Fatherland, Barrack, and School**

The relationship between nationalism and war is underlined by the role of education as a facilitator and preparatory training for military life and war. Modern states aspired to the long-term molding of national consciousness through educational indoctrination and military mobilization. Of the two, the aim of mass education was more all-pervasive and long-term than mass conscription, ordinary citizens could welcome it more positively, despite heavy fines and even sequestration for nonattendance. The intimate connection between military service, patriotic coaching, and educational standardization is epitomized by Napoleon’s ‘nation in arms,’ with its fusion of barrack and school: Napoleon was both hailed as the greatest military strategist and the ‘education Emperor.’ He implemented the standardization of the curriculum, instituted the lycées system, introduced school uniforms and examination procedures, reinforced the bureaucratic structure, and drafted newly stringent disciplinary standards. For Napoleon, a national elite could be formed by evenly applying military-like discipline and the principle of ‘equal’ opportunities to education, with copious largesse of newly established scholarships. The main goal was to forge a class of officials capable of administering his empire and leading his armies. The system sought to imbue young pupils with patriotic–militarist virtues and shape them into loyal servants of the central state. Napoleon’s own military formation exerted a decisive impact on his confusion between the civic, educational, and military spheres (Colin, 1900).

**The Westernization of the World: Nationalism and Conscription**

Napoleon’s project of a ‘nation-in-arms’ with its ‘citizen-soldiers’ was emulated across the ecumene with various degrees of intensity. Mass conscription was thus instituted in a host of countries of both the developed and developing world, from Prussia and Russia to Turkey and Japan, where it often merged with extreme forms of nationalism. In Japan, the new Meiji rulers (1870–81) transformed the *samurai* class system into the Imperial army through nationalism, education, and conscripton (Harries and Harries, 1991). Conscription was one of the first measures taken in 1860 by the newly formed Kingdom of Italy: since the start it acted in tandem with the elementary school system to shape and structure a unitary Italian identity. Most of these governments saw conscription and militarization “as an instrument for developing social cohesion and political docility of the masses” (Bond, 1986: 32).

**Pax Britannica, Industrial Development, and Empire Building (1815–1914)**

The period spanning broadly from Waterloo to World War I, and particularly from 1870 to 1914, is often described as an era of peace and stability. However, just as continental empires collapsed, colonial empires expanded, while some state elites consolidated their grip on power over their rivals. Nation-states strengthened their control over citizens through the twin ideologies of modernism and patriotism, while intensifying the colonial scramble for the unspoiled. War and destruction were simply being exported beyond European borders and, by the late nineteenth century, an unrestrained *laissez-faire* economy had induced a series of ‘late Victorian Holocausts’ (Davis, 2001), including artificial droughts and floods in which millions perished. Linda Colley noted, “the profit and the price of this hundred-year partial European peace was unprecedented Western, and especially British, freedom to concentrate on global empire. In 1880, the European powers, together with Russia and the United States, laid claim to some 35 percent of the globe’s total land area. By 1914 … [their] proportion of the globe … had risen to 84 percent” (Colley, 2002: 311). In
ideological terms, racism accompanied empire building just like nationalism propelled state making, as the two sides of the same coin.

Franco-Prussian Militarism

Strategically located between Prussia and imperial Britain, France was able to combine extreme imperialism and radical nationalism. In a fierce emulative competition, France and Prussia built powerful armies, bureaucracies, and industries. The Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) exerted unprecedented pressures to discipline and assimilate their respective populations, making ordinary people more conform to state directives and control.

Engaging in grandiose project of nation-building and social engineering, official nationalism acquired the capacity to produce that very ‘self-disciplined subjectivity’ necessary for the state to exert control both within and outside official institutions. This made possible broader forms of organizational discipline, and finally the participation of the masses into industrialized warfare. In a kind of domino effect, the Franco-Prussian militarism spread across the globe but spared parts of the West, like the Iberian Peninsula, the British Isles, and upper Scandinavia. King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden (1594–1632) introduced much earlier uniforms and regiments-based conscription districts in Sweden and Finland in which enlisted peasants replaced mercenary soldiers, so that military historians attribute to this important change, the Swedish victory in the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48). Britain’s imperial makeup turned the navy, rather than the army, into the key military force (Kiernan, 1998): Still in 1850 only about 105 000 armed personnel could be defined as military: that was “less than a third of the size of France’s military at that time, less than an eighth of Russia’s, and smaller even than the army of Prussia which possessed no colonies at all” (Colley, 2002: 312). Significantly, England/Wales was also one of the last places in Europe to adopt compulsory education (1880). Thus in Britain, “the army never became the school of the nation,” but simply functioned as a rite of passage to adulthood, ‘making men’ more than making British men (Showalter, 2010: 142). This contrasted with Prussia, where the “military service was the precondition not only to full manhood, but also to full citizenship” (Berger, 2008: 620). However, just like in Prussia and France, war became a nation-builder since the British wars with Catholic France drove the distinct Protestant denominations into a closer union, reminding them of what they shared (Colley, 1992). In other respects, and until quite late, the British Empire did not follow the continental drift toward army aggrandizement and mass conscription.

Pupils into Soldiers: Expanding the Franco-Prussian Model

In 1880, France’s minister of education, Jules Ferry (1832–93), introduced a set of sweeping reforms to impose compulsory, ‘nonclerical’ (laisque) education, which aspired to nationalize the masses through nationalist indoctrination by raising the public profile of the army. School reforms included courses in military exercises, gymnastics, needlework (for girls), and the actual replacement of religion with the cult of la Patrie. Eugene Weber describes the pedagogical catechism imposed throughout the Hexagone calling for the child’s “duty to defend the fatherland, to shed his blood or die for the commonweal, … to obey the government, to perform military service, to work, learn, pay taxes and so on. At the very start of school, children were taught that their first duty was to defend their countries as soldiers …”. Commencement speeches recalled this sacred duty in ritual terms – our boys will defend the soil of the fatherland. The whole school programme turned on expanding the theme” (Weber, 1976: 333). All disciplines were harnessed to this goal: history, literature, geography, and civic education. However, in terms of acculturation, by 1896, the army had proved to be “an agency as potent in its way as the schools” (Weber, 1976: 302).

In reality, after the defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, such developments were no longer uniquely endogenous: the nationalist stress on the education–military linkage mimicked developments in rival Prussia. For Peter Paret, “French adopted from Prussia not only true conscription … and the modern general-staff structure, but also the collaboration of the elementary schools and the conscript army to teach nationalism to the masses” (Paret, 1993: 49). The Franco-Prussian mutual contaminations expanded tangentially beside the army into other organizational and bureaucratic areas. Prussian developments were in turn a response to previous French threats and invasions: In 1813, Frederick William III “embarked upon a military mobilization that, for the first time, extended the obligation, and opportunity, to serve in war through all levels of Prussian society. Within the framework of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, the Prussian Erhebung … was the movement that came closest to capturing the dynamism … of the French effort twenty years before” (Moran, 2003: 3–4). In other words, conservative Prussia followed the footsteps of revolutionary France, which in turn began a cycle of emulative competition, so that the roles were soon reversed; whereas, France was the initial model for export and even though Prussia had turned into a military state already before the French Revolution, Prussia became the apprentice who outdid the master, turning itself into the military and bureaucratic model to be imitated across the Europe and Asia, including in France.

Similarly, schools elsewhere acted as indoctrinating institutions. Thus, in Japan, primary and secondary schools operated to coach students for the imperial army, while teachers were trained in military barracks (Harries and Harries, 1991). In Turkey, the ‘military-nation’ based on education became ‘foundational myth of Turkish nationalism’ (Altınoy, 2004). One decade after France’s defeat by Prussia (1871), “one could neatly perceive the notion of a Spartan-style education, entirely devoted to patriotic adulation and where the school became the antechamber of the barracks” (Girardet, 1953: 164). Propaganda through schooling and mass media became essential in the dissemination of militarism and was the key in the process:

In the 1870s … nearly every French family became acquainted with the nature of army life. The darker aspects of barrack life were pushed into the background; what mattered above all was to prepare for the

While conscription was highly unpopular in some areas, with various anticonscript revolts both before and after Napoleon’s times (Aaslestad, 2012; Forrest, 2012; Planert, 2012), soldiers’ memoirs describe military service in highly commendable, praiseworthy terms (Bond, 1986: 35). The army’s popularity was largely founded on the persisting myth of the ‘nation-in-arms’ as appeared during the late revolutionary period and then regulated by Napoleon (Forrest, 2009). “Prior to 1920, there was no serious discussion of conscientious objection in France. Insoumis, rebels and insubordinates, and refractaires, draft dodgers, were a serious problem for the government at times” (Levi, 1997: 186). It is also possible that nationalism exerted a mobilizing function before soldiers joined their battalions and regiments, serving more to tie up civil society to the military, while justifying both military spending and human sacrifice.

The army provided a deeper and faster emotional impact on conscripts than compulsory education could exert on pupils – particularly in wartimes. School took much longer to shape loyal citizens than the drastic, strongly centralized, and hierarchical barrack. Isolation from family and friend, punishment, drill, and round-the-clock propaganda yielded more drastic results than the deeper river’s flow of half-day classes.

Class was also an important factor. Through decades of propaganda, schooling, centralization, and bureaucratization, French peasants had incorporated a humiliating sense of class inferiority and often desired to remove the stigma associated with rural mores and illiteracy (Weber, 1976). For some of them, economic incentives for joining the army were significant at a time when rural life was disintegrating, state centralization pressed on, and massive taxation exacted a heavy toll on ordinary citizens. Despite widespread resentment against various forms of state intrusion and repression, the idea that the Patrie was being victimized and its soil violated awakened powerful patriotic sentiments. Ordinary citizens were taught to see the soldier as the supreme expression of the collective will, condensing the finest of national virtues: “War itself became an homogenizing experience as soldiers and sailors represented the entire nation and the civilian population endured common privations and responsibilities” (Tilly, 1990: 116).

**War, Industry, and Nation: The Egalitarian Impetus**

Industrialization and militarism, particularly when supplemented by nationalism, shared the mirage of equal relationships, underpinning new social relations characterized by invocations to ‘egalitarianism,’ which in turn concealed simultaneous interchangeability and hierarchization. Political cohesion was pursued first within the barracks, then within society at large, while the latter was being radically reshaped by industrialization. The mass army was possibly the most ‘egalitarian,’ yet the most hierarchical of the major modern institutions; while the rigidity of the chain of command remains inexpugnable, an army can only work on the basis of equal duties, rights, and behavior of its low-level ranks (only within the prison the new combination of hierarchy and egalitarianism yielded possibly more appalling human costs).

Due to practical reasons, emerging modern armies experienced first and most forcefully the demand for cultural standardization and recruits’ sameness. For instance, the U.S. army anticipated desegregation before the heydays of the civil rights movements, Fascism enrolled Italian peasants on the basis of the egalitarian promises, both symbolic (military comradeship) and tangible (pensions, special rights). This ‘egalitarian’ emphasis in times of war was shared by authoritarian, totalitarian, and democratic systems. In this way, dissent could be controlled through unprecedented, and otherwise unattainable, forms of conformism. But conformism also led to extermination, as replaceability does not value individual life and human uniqueness. In the process, European states led the way by “building up fearsome coercive means of their own as they deprived civilian populations of access to those means,” relying mostly on capital and capitalists to reorganize coercion (Tilly, 1990: 68–69). Their impact was so far-reaching that a whole global order emerged in its image.

In the social sciences, “there is virtually no disagreement that the eruption of war almost instinctively increases in-group solidarity and national homogeneity,” although it is likely that “macro-level solidarity and group homogeneity exhibited in times of violent conflicts originate outside of these conflicts … (and) homogenisation is a complex process that requires a great deal of long-term institutional work” (Malešević, 2010: 179–180). In fact, before war could complete its task of bureaucratizing and militarizing society, preparations for war had already hard-pressed citizens toward greater forms of homogeneity. But war itself contributed to wiping out many local cultures in all of the belligerent countries, while contributing to the enemy’s cultural obliteration. For Eugene Weber, it was the experience of World War I, which proved decisive in diluting local attachments (Weber, 1976).

**World War I**

State-building, the cultivation of patriotism, colonial aggrandizement, economic expansion, heavy industrialization, and the unprecedented advance of technological progress led to uncontrollable military buildup, which finally exploded with World War I. Industries, economic welfare, and military arsenals expanded until everything short-circuited under the ‘European apocalypses’ of 1914–18.

Rapid industrial development meant that for the first time peasants could move in larger number to the cities leaving behind millennial traditions. A powerful and influential class of new riches emerged, which often embraced war, nationalism, and modernity with similar enthusiasm and greed. In many consolidated nation-states, like Italy, Germany, and France, modernists and ultranationalists became the most prominent advocates of war, including poets like d’Annunzio and Apollinaire, and art entrepreneurs like Marinetti (Conversi, 2009).
Before the conflagration, Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) understood well the destructive linkage between nationalism and war:

To free people from those terrible calamities of armaments and wars, which they suffer now, and which keep growing greater and greater, we do not need congresses, conferences, treaties, or tribunals, but the abolition of that implement of violence that is called government, and from which originates all the greatest calamities of men. To abolish the governments only one thing is needed. It is necessary that men should understand that the sentiment of patriotism, which alone maintains this implement of violence, is a coarse, harmful, disgraceful, bad, and above all, immoral sentiment.

Tolstoy 1901, 1905: 157

This bitter commentary would remain unheeded and submerged by the more vociferous noise of patriotic war mongering. Interstate competition was measured not only in terms of technological progress, but also in the application of new technologies to the practice of war. For instance, the cavalry had remained the key unit until 1916, when war compelled armies to replace horses and cavalrymen with tanks and technically trained drivers, codrivers, gunners, radio operators, and specialist mechanics (Diamond, 2003), therefore amplifying and deepening bureaucratization. In terms of citizens and education, most states continued to further their goal of building homogenous communities in which school and army played a conjunct role in fomenting extreme patriotism and a quasi-religious cult for the Fatherland. The deification and divinization of the state, which first manifested itself under Robespierre, became the new ‘normal’ throughout Europe, as it was perfected and magnified by Fascism and Nazism.

The Peak of Nationalist Homogenization: From World War I to World War II (1914–45)

In Charles Tilly’s words, the modern nation-state’s yearning for homogeneity and control spawned ‘the most bellicose century in human history’ with about 275 wars, 115 million deaths in battle, and over 115 civilian deaths during the whole century (Tilly, 1990: 67). However, these data are still ‘optimistic’ because they exclude hundreds of millions and more killed by the state, through policies of genocide, politicide, ‘classicide,’ starvation, population transfer, economic manipulation, and war-related diseases (Mann, 2005). Moreover, “until World War II, more victims of war died of war-borne microbes than of battle wounds” (Diamond, 2003: 197). Tilly (1985) famously describes the modern state as a racket organization built on the taxation of uprooted, terrorized citizens, who were thus offered military ‘protection.’ More specifically, “the military played a prime role, influencing both the state apparatus and other organizations including, at a later date, business firms. For it was to a large extent in the military sphere that administrative power in the modern guise was pioneered” (1985: 113).

Nationalism, War, and Genocide

The linkage between war and genocide is so deeply established among scholars of all disciplines as to appear indissociable (Markusen and Kopf, 1995). In fact, the two have been defined as the ‘Siamese twins of history’ (Jones, 2010: 48). There is further consensus that interstate wars provide the ideal circumstance for carrying out atrocities which would be unthinkable in peace times (Bartrop, 2002; Fettweis, 2003; Levene, 2005; Melson, 1992; Shaw, 2003). Under the aegis of total war, pressures toward ethnic and cultural homogenization reached their peak. When the Anglo-French allied forces landed in Gallipoli in 1915, Turkey’s military authorities began a ‘securitization’ campaign against the entire Armenian population, whom they perceived as the West’s ‘fifth column.’ “What turned a war crime into a genocidal act was the context of total war […] that translated deportation swiftly into the mass slaughter, abuse, and starvation of an entire ethnic group potentially troublesome to an authoritarian regime at war” (Winter, 2003: 208). Under siege by the ‘West,’ Turkey’s elites ended up imitating the West. As a consequence, their military nationalism bred a ‘culture of hatred’ that demonized Christians and non-Turks. Bartrop’s (1996, 2001) work on Hitler’s war in the east anticipated much of this war-centered approach as the Shoah was also carried out beneath the curtains and under the strains of war.

Fascism, War, and Nationalism

The relationship between war and nationalism, militarism, and patriotism reached its apogee under Fascism. After the calamities of war, the short-lived interwar hiatus was soon thwarted by the rise of Fascism with its futurist political religion, totalitarian symbolism, and a program of radically remaking society (Gentile, 2003). Totalitarianism can be described as a continuation of the state of war (Keegan, 1999; Mondini, 2006). During the war, European, American, and Asian political, military, and cultural elites had experimented an extraordinary control over their societies through mass mobilization. They were generally keen on preserving this power. Most importantly, all-pervasive war censorship was not limited to the war front, but had engulfed the whole of society, and therefore it was never completely lifted after the war. Moreover, the choir of propaganda, chants of victory, and patriotic rhetoric were continued. Despite the enormous sufferings, the cataclysmic destruction, and the obvious strategic errors that cost the lives of thousands, none of these were debated (rather than celebrated) at length, except within marginal sectors of society whose voice could not be heard as widely as necessary. Moreover, the anarchist movement had been annihilated by the war, when most anarchists turned to nationalism, socialism or died. Religious and socialist organizations, which had tried to articulate programs founded on peace-building, had scarce access to the mass media. In short, the war had emboldened elites and these generally had no intention of surrendering the unprecedented control over society they had achieved. In Italy, where an antiwar socialist and Catholic opposition was relatively vocal, both mainstream and fringe media continued their bellicose propaganda. A broad spectrum of public opinion became convinced that Italy’s ‘sacrifice’ had been in vain, since the ‘perverse’ postwar international order had not accomplished the realization of the nationalists’
maximalist-irredentist goals, in particular the seizure of Istria and Dalmatia. The creation of Yugoslavia and the treaty of Versailles (1918) had been a blow to Italian nationalists, eager to control both shores of the Adriatic. War veterans imbued by expansionist nationalism played a key role in forming the political atmosphere, which propelled Benito Mussolini into prominence. Fascism itself emerged from outside the military sphere; but, once seized power, it promoted increasingly stringent alliances with military cadres. In turn, post-World War I military elites embraced Fascist ideology to fight against antipatriotic ‘decadence’ and the ‘ ingratitude’ of ordinary Italians (Mondini, 2006). Contrary to Germany, compulsory draft (leva obbligatoria or naja) had been kept unchanged in Italy since the early days of the unitary state. The Nazis reestablished conscription in March 1935, emboldening the Third Reich’s triadic relationship between militarization, nationalism, and mass industrialization.

Postwar Era and Globalization (1945–Present)

The new postwar international institutions and military alliances (like NATO), as well as regional federations (the EU) became an effective way to overcome international conflicts and divisions, so that war and nationalism could be increasingly disjointed and divorced. As we know, the Cold War (1948–89) had frozen most ethnonational conflicts, while threatening a nuclear Armageddon. After the Cold War, the eruption of localized ethnic clashes and regional wars showed that some of these had remained latent. However, other conflicts may have resulted from the rapid meltdown of the old system and the unmediated passage from late Soviet authoritarianism (or Yugoslav benevolent one-party rule) to a regime of wild economic liberalization and the adoption of international rules emanating from outside Europe (IMF, World Bank).

Since the 1980s, neoliberal globalization had been weakening state institutions, a decay and lack of control has been made visible by the interlocking 2008–12 financial and banking crises. Savage neoliberalism has corroded democratic and representative institutions throughout the world, establishing an unprecedented influence of giant multinational corporations and organized crime over the political affairs of nearly every single country. This power reconfiguration also reinforced specific potent institutions within existing states, amplifying bureaucracy, compressing cultural functions, and expanding repressive areas like policing and surveillance. The triumph of ‘free-market’ ideology has been so complete and devastating that, for the first time in human history, the use of financial capital(s) lies beyond the control of any human actor or institution, let alone the state. In other words, the bulk of free-flowing, boundless financial capital no longer performs an economic function. However, state power did not surrender its monopoly of tax levy and coercion within its territory – and has indeed increased the incarceration of citizens and noncitizens. Nationalism is no less significant now than before, but its relationship with both the state and the military has deeply changed.

On a more positive note, the rise of the doctrine of human rights shifted the focus on individuals and nondominant groups allowing many submerged voices to express themselves by lifting the veil of censorship. In this way, conflicts could be prevented and successfully terminated through consociational or other arrangements, which did not require secession or threaten state breakup, therefore pointing to the possibility of the nation-state.

Future Challenges

It is perhaps too early to assess the impact of unregulated globalization and its likely relationship with new wars, some alimented by the persistence of state nationalism, others by the rise of nonstate nationalism. An area which will not fail to produce groundbreaking research is the relationship between anthropogenic climate change and conflict, including war and nationalism. Against the backdrop of mass human displacement, global emergency may call for a universal supervising body, but crucial decisions may still take place within the hidebound confines of state arenas. Sooner, rather than later, these may include addressing highly taboo questions, like whether or not top carbon dioxide emitters might need to offer shelter to thousands, possibly millions, of environmental refugees. Although these and related issues have been kept at arm’s length from the political agenda, they are likely to generate heated public controversy once, and if, released to broader sectors of the public opinion. The rise of higher barriers to stem free human movement lead to an exponential growth of mass policing and surveillance, leading in turn to unprecedented measures of mass expulsions, which may in turn feed extreme violence both by and against the state (Zimmerer, 2014). Worst-case scenarios adumbrate the collapse of entire systems, with those layers weakened by neoliberal globalization, like health and education, falling first. Once climate change begins to hit more dramatically core countries like China and the United States, a descent into international chaos may well push the world into a state of perpetual war alimented and toughened by nationalism. But many predictions are destined to fail, as eco-environmental issues are always complicated by the intrusion of capricious, volatile, arbitrary variables, like uncontrollable epidemics and other climate-related health issues. A new relationship between war and nationalism is likely to emerge through a new geopolitics of ‘securitization’ as sketchily described in this final section.

Conclusions

Dying for the ‘fatherland’ may not be a contemporary fixation: Horace’s epigram Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori (‘It is sweet and good to die for one’s country’) expressed a similar mandate during the time of Augustus, the founder of the Roman Empire. What makes the difference with modern times is a superimposed multilayered ideological apparatus, whose upper layer is constituted by nationalism – with various intermediate layers like egalitarianism and
the faith in progress subsumed in it. Although bureaucratization and centralization predated the French revolution, politics and warfare changed forever once infused with nationalism. A wider project of mass self-abnegation and sacrifice could only be conceived by political elites in a post-1789 scenario.

Key to the nation-state’s war effort has been its capacity to secure the willingness of its able-bodied citizens to die for a ‘higher’ ideal. Such power of life and death over most of its population, previously unthinkable, could only occur when nationalism allowed ordinary citizens to visualize the nation as a unified, organic body, the defense of which demanded individual sacrifice.

The second essential element was ‘replicability’ or replaceability: despite the cult of patriotic heroes, no individual was unique enough not to be fully replaceable by another individual like him. All this was made possible by nationalism’s ability to conceal new hierarchies of power behind a rhetoric curtain of egalitarianism. Replicability was largely founded on a previously established stress on national homogeneity encouraging conformism, uniformity, obedience, peer pressure, cultural standardization, and fear of criticism, while confounding nation, ethnicity, and culture. Although these have been systematically cultivated in peace times through nationalism as a mass-mobilizing ideology (Maleshević, 2010), it was during the war, and through the war experience, that they could shape society at a deeper level while removing all traces of constructive dissent. Therefore, World War I provided rulers with an opportunity to practice totalitarianism before its ‘lessons’ could be systematically applied by fascism and communism. In other words, totalitarianism manifested itself first in the trenches as an ‘ancillary’ aspect of the relation between war and nationalism.

State-builders were often obsessed with shaping the character, virtue, and manners of their citizens. Barrack and school continuously overlapped: the army served to inculcate the values of patriotism and the education system served to prepare the youth for army life. Whenever war and education were joined, nationalism would provide the ideological foundation underpinning the entire bureaucratic military apparatus. The entire armor of human and technological advantages acquired during the prewar period and the Belle Époque through unprecedented accumulation, military growth, free-market expansion, and interstate competition was ultimately unleashed in World War I.

Despite our self-assuring confidence that the postwar order somehow protects us from repeating the tragedies of the past, new and more devastating crises quite possibly loom ahead. The environmental crisis, with its trail of wars, displacements, hunger, epidemics, economic meltdown, and health disasters, may put an unprecedented pressure on existing institutions by spawning new unforeseeable relationships between war and nationalism.

**See also:** First World War, The; French Revolution, The; Genocide and War; Militarism; Military Sociology; Military, War, and Politics; Nation-State and War; National Socialism and Fascism; Nationalism, Sociology of; Nationalism: General;

### Bibliography


