

3. Securitization and Desecuritization

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During the mid-1980s, observers frequently noticed that the concept of security had been subjected to little reflection in comparison with how much and how strongly it had been used. Only a few years later, conceptual reflections on the concept of security have become so common that it is almost embarrassing to, once again, discuss or re-conceptualize *security*. Nonetheless, in this chapter I present one possible perspective on security, and assess its implications in terms of four different security agendas. My primary aim here is not to provide a detailed discussion of this new approach--a more detailed exposition can be found elsewhere¹--but to illustrate the contrast between this perspective and more traditional approaches, which I intend to bring out via conceptual discussion and by addressing selected "security debates."

I could begin by expressing a certain discontent with the "traditional progressive" or "established radical" ways of dealing with the concept and agenda of security. The traditional progressive approach is: 1) to accept two basic premises of the established discourse, first that security is a reality prior to language, is out there (irrespective of whether the conception is "objective" or "subjective," is measured in terms of threat or fear), and second the more security, the better; and 2) to argue why security should encompass *more* than is currently the case, including not only "xx" but also "yy," where the latter is environment, welfare, immigration and refugees, etc. With this approach, one accepts the core meaning of "security" as uncontested, pushing instead in the direction of securitizing still larger areas of social life.

Still, in the final analysis, is it all to the good that problems such as environmental degradation be addressed in terms of security? After all, in spite of all the changes of the last few years, security, as with any other concept, carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape. At the heart of the concept we still find something to do with defense and the state. As a result, addressing an issue in security terms still evokes an image of threat-defense, allocating to the state an important role in addressing it. This is not always an improvement.

Why not turn this procedure upside down? In place of accepting implicitly the meaning of "security" as given and then attempting to broaden its coverage, why not try instead to put a mark on the concept *itself*, by entering into and through its core? This means changing the tradition by taking it seriously rather than criticizing it from the outside.² I begin by considering security as a concept and a word. Next, I discuss security as a *speech act*. In the third part of the essay, I describe four cases of *securitization* and *de-securitization*. Finally, I ask whether we might not want to use "security" as it is classically understood, after all.

Security: The Concept and the Word

During the 1980s we witnessed a general move to broaden the security agenda.³ One approach was to

move from a strict focus on the security of the *state* (national security) toward a broader or alternative focus on the security of *people*, either as individuals or as a global or international collectivity. The security of individuals can be affected in numerous ways; indeed, economic welfare, environmental concerns, cultural identity, and political rights are germane more often than military issues in this respect. The major problem with such an approach is deciding where to stop, since the concept of security otherwise becomes a synonym for everything that is politically good or desirable. How, then, can we get any clear sense of the specific character of *security* issues, as distinct from other problems that beset the human condition? To what extent can we apply any of the methods and lessons of security studies to this broadened agenda?

Johan Galtung and Jan Øberg have formulated an alternative concept of security, based on four sets of positive goals related to human needs: survival, development, freedom, and identity. Within this framework, security becomes "the combined defence policy for each need category, the totality of defence endeavours of the entire human-societal organization."⁴ The result is a holistic program for world society and its development, welfare, and so on. This is a wholly legitimate approach, of course, but does it impinge at all on *security* debates? Certainly, the central actors and theorists in the field do not feel affected or threatened by this framework.⁵ Moreover, there is no basic logic to this wider conception of security except for the corrective/mirror image of the traditional concept. And, in addition, the baseline in the Galtung/Øberg conception is the individual level. Security is then linked to all other goals, since they are all generated from the individual level: the individual has various needs and can be hurt by threats to these needs, and this makes everything a potential security problem. At least three, interrelated problems follow: First, the concept of security becomes all-inclusive and is thereby emptied of content; second, the lack of explicit attention to the connotative core of classical security makes the Galtung/Øberg approach an innocent contributor to the reproduction--and even expansion--of securitization; and, third, there is a lack of political effect on "security," as traditionally defined.

Widening along the *referent object* axis--that is, saying that "security is not only military defense of the state, it is also x and y and z"--has the unfortunate effect of expanding the security realm endlessly, until it encompasses the whole social and political agenda. This is not, however, just an unhappy coincidence or a temporary lack of clear thinking. The problem is that, as concepts, *neither individual security nor international security exist*. National security, that is, the security of the state, is the name of an ongoing debate, a tradition, an established set of practices and, as such, the concept has a rather formalized referent; conversely, the "security" of whomever/whatever is a very unclear idea. There is no literature, no philosophy, no tradition of "security" in non-state terms; it is only as a critical idea, played out against the concept and practices of state security, that other threats and referents have any meaning. An abstract idea of "security" is a nonanalytical term bearing little relation to the *concept* of security implied by national or state security.

To the extent that we have an idea of a specific modality labelled "security" it is *because* we think of national security and its modifications and limitations, and not because we think of the everyday word "security." The discourse on "alternative security" makes meaningful statements not by drawing primarily on the register of everyday security but through its contrast with national security. Books and articles such as Jan Øberg's *At Sikre Udvikling og Udvikle Sikkerhed*, Richard H. Ullman's "Redefining Security," and Jessica Tuchman Mathews's "Redefining Security" are, consequently, abundant with "not only," "also" and "more than" arguments.⁶ This reveals that they have no generic concept of the meaning of security--only the one uncritically borrowed from the traditional view, and multiplied and extended to

new fields. Thus, it seems reasonable to be conservative along this axis, accepting that "security" is influenced in important ways by *dynamics* at the level of individuals and the global system, but not by propagating unclear terms such as individual security and global security. The *concept* of security refers to the state.

The first edition of Barry Buzan's *People, States and Fear* (1983) failed to make clear how this problem might be handled. There was an obvious tension between the title of the book and its subtitle, *The National Security Problem in International Relations*. The three levels of analysis--individual, state and international system--were central to Buzan's argument, although national security remained, in some sense, privileged. Still, was it Buzan's intention to make a "triple-decker" out of the concept of security, or was he simply providing a contextualization of national security? This point has been clarified in the second edition of the book (1991), where Buzan argues that the state level *is* privileged even as national security cannot be comprehended at the state level alone. What national security links to at the other levels is not primarily individual security and international security, but dynamics and political processes of various kinds at these other levels.⁷

Buzan has shown powerfully that national security can neither be sufficiently understood nor realistically achieved from a perspective limited to one's own state. National security is fundamentally dependent on international dynamics (especially *regional* ones), but this is not the same as a relationship between national security and international *security*. Therefore, as indicated in Figure 3.1, I do not locate security at three levels but at the *center* of the hourglass image.

"Security," in other words, has to be read through the lens of *national* security.

Of course, "security" has an everyday meaning (being secure, safe, not threatened). Quite separate from this, though, the term "security" has acquired a number of connotations, assumptions, and images derived from the "international" discussion of national security, security policy, and the like. But, in these discussions, the conceptualization of security has little to do with application of the everyday meaning to an object (nation or state), followed by an examination as to when the state is secure (as if "security" possessed an independent, stable, context-free meaning that could be added to another stable, independently defined object, the state).




Figure 3.1 Hourglass model of security.

Rather, the label "security" has become the indicator of a specific problematique, a specific *field of practice*. Security is, in historical terms, the field where states threaten each other, challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence, and so on. Security,

moreover, has not been a constant field; it has evolved and, since World War II, has been transformed into a rather coherent and recognizable field. In this process of continuous, gradual transformation, the strong military identification of earlier times has been diminished--it is, in a sense, always there, but more and more often in metaphorical form, as other wars, other challenges--while the images of "challenges to sovereignty" and defense have remained central.

If we want to rethink or reconstruct the concept of security, therefore, it is necessary that we keep an eye on the entire field of practice. This is contrary to the now-standard debates on "redefining security," inasmuch as those who want radically to rethink the concept generally tend to cancel out the specific field. The concept is thus reduced to its everyday sense, which is only a semantic *identity*, not the *concept* of security. Of course, both choices are completely legitimate, but this question of language politics depends ultimately on what we wish to accomplish. If our intent is to determine when we are secure, the investigation can address many levels. If, however, we want to add something new to ongoing debates on "security" (in strategic studies) and national interests, we must begin with *those* debates, taking on that problematique, so that we can get at the specific dynamics of that field, and show how these old elements operate in new ways and new places.

The specificity, in other words, is to be found in the *field* and in certain typical *operations* within the field (speech acts--"security"--and modalities--threat-defense sequences), not in a clearly definable objective ("security") or a specific state of affairs ("security"). Beginning from the modality of specific types of interactions in a specific social arena, we can rethink the concept "security" in a way that is true to the classical discussion. By working from the inside of the classical discussion, we can take the concepts of national security, threat, and sovereignty, and show how, on the collective level, they take on new forms under new conditions. We can then strip the classical discussion of its preoccupation with military matters by applying the *same* logic to other sectors, and we can de-link the discussion from the state by applying similar moves to *society* (as I shall show, below). With this, we maintain a mode of thinking, a set of rules and codes from the field of "security" as it has evolved and continues to evolve.

To start instead from being secure in the everyday sense means that we to the now-standard depend up approaching security policy from the *outside*, that is, via another language game. My premise here is, therefore, that we can identify a specific field of social interaction, with a specific set of actions and codes, known by a set of agents as the security field. In international society, for example, a number of codes, rules, and understandings have been established that make international relations an intersubjectively defined social reality possessing its own specific laws and issues.⁸ National security is similarly social in the sense of being constituted intersubjectively in a specific field,⁹ and it should not be measured against some real or true yardstick of "security" derived from (contemporary) domestic society.

An alternative route to a wider concept of security is to broaden the security agenda to include threats other than military ones. When widening takes place along this axis, it is possible to retain the specific quality characterizing security problems: Urgency; state power claiming the legitimate use of extraordinary means; a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing the political "we" from dealing with any other questions. With this approach, it is possible that any sector, at any particular time, might be the most important focus for concerns about threats, vulnerabilities, and defense. Historically, of course, the military sector has been most important.¹⁰

Strategic studies often focused on the military aspects of security, whereas the realists and neorealists of International Relations seldom a priori defined military threats as primary. Indeed, Morgenthau, Aron,

and many others took the position that, to ensure its security, a state would make its own choices according to expediency and effectiveness, and these might not always involve military means. A state would make threats in the sector in which the best options were available. A response (security policy, defense) would often, but not always, have to be made in the same sector, depending on whether one sector might overpower another, and military means simply were often the strongest available. Logically speaking, the means to security should be secondary to the ends--that is, a conflict and the political decisions involved, as Clausewitz pointed out--and, thus, it has seemed a viable strategy to expand security in terms of *sectors* while keeping the state focus. Indeed, this is not only an academic option, it is also, to a large degree, what has taken place in political discourse, as the name of the field has through this century changed from war to defense to "security."

Still, what ties all of this together as security? When Buzan moves from his discussion of security in military terms to security in the political, economic, ecological, and societal sectors, the logic clearly says that security begins as a military field that is increasingly challenged by these new sectors. The question remains, however: What made the military sector conspicuous, and what now qualifies the others to almost equal status? While Buzan does not squarely address this question, he does hint at an answer. Military threats have been primary in the past because they emerged "very swiftly" and with "a sense of outrage at unfair play"; if defeated, a state would find itself laid bare to imposition of the conqueror's will.¹¹ Such outcomes used to characterize the military sector. But, if the same overturning of the political order can be accomplished by economic or political methods, these, too, will constitute security problems.¹²

From the discussion above, it follows that the basic definition of a security problem is something that can undercut the political order within a state and thereby "alter the premises for all other questions." As Buzan shows, the literature largely treats security as "freedom from threat," both objectively and subjectively.¹³ Threats seen as relevant are, for the most part, those that effect the self-determination and sovereignty of the unit. *Survival*¹⁴ might sound overly dramatic but it is, in fact, the survival of the unit *as* a basic political unit--a sovereign state--that is the key. Those issues with this undercutting potential must therefore be addressed prior to all others because, if they are not, the state will cease to exist as a sovereign unit and all other questions will become irrelevant. This, then, provides us with a test point, and shows what is lost if we "de-compose" the state by individualizing security. With the approach I have suggested here, even if challenges can operate on the different components of the state, they must still pass through one focus: Do the challenges determine whether the state is to be or not to be?¹⁵

When a specific issue is turned into a test case, everything becomes concentrated at one point, since the outcome of the test will frame all future questions. This logic is spelled out most clearly, perhaps, by Clausewitz, who shows that, although politics has to be prior to military, the logic of war--the *ziel* of war, victory--replaces the logic of politics--the specific *zweck*. To enter a war is a political decision, but once in, one has to play according to the grammar of *war*, not politics, which would mean playing less well and losing the political aim, as well. Rousseau put it thus: "War is not, therefore, a relation of man to man but a relation of state to state, in which individuals are enemies only by accident, not as men or even as citizens, but as soldiers, not as members of the homeland, but as its defenders."¹⁶ Rousseau's argument is presented here in terms of literal war, but the observation applies to "metaphorical war" that is, to other "tests of will and strength."¹⁷

The inner logic of war follows from its basic character as an *unconstrained* situation, in which the

combatants each try to function at maximum efficiency in relation to a clearly defined aim. During war, a state is confronted with a test of *will* --testing whether it is still a sovereign unit--in which the ability to fend off a challenge is *the* criterion for forcing the others to acknowledge its sovereignty and identity as a state.¹⁸ It is, in fact, not the particular means (military) that define a situation as war, it is the structure of the "game." Logically speaking, therefore, it is a coincidence that military means have traditionally been the *ultimo ratio* .

The basic logic of Clausewitz's argument thus follows from the situation of an ultimate test: what then is logically to be done? "War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds; as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to an extreme."¹⁹ The loser is forced to submit, and the outcome is defined in polar terms: victory-defeat. From this, it follows that the first logic for each party is: "Throw forward all forces" (therefore the inherent tendency for escalation in war); subsequently, various specific mechanisms intervene to modify this injunction.

War, then, is "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will"²⁰ and, therefore, "War, insofar as it is a social act, presupposes the conflicting wills of politically organized collectivities."²¹ It is in this struggle for recognition (Hegel) that states establish their identity as states. Nonetheless, this struggle can take place in spheres other than the military one; the priority of military means is a contingent, technical feature. Consequently, the logic of war--of challenge-resistance(defense)-escalation-recognition/defeat--could be replayed metaphorically and extended to other sectors. When this happens, however, the structure of the game is still derived from the most classical of classical cases: war.

From *Alternative Security* to *Security, the Speech Act*

Reading the theoretical literature on security, one is often left without a good answer to a simple question: What really makes something a security problem? As I have suggested above, security problems are developments that threaten the sovereignty or independence of a state in a particularly rapid or dramatic fashion, and deprive it of the capacity to manage by itself. This, in turn, undercuts the political order. Such a threat must therefore be met with the mobilization of the maximum effort.

Operationally, however, this means: *In naming a certain development a security problem, the "state" can claim a special right* , one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites. Trying to press the kind of unwanted fundamental political change on a ruling elite is similar to playing a game in which one's opponent can change the rules at any time s/he likes. Power holders can always try to use the instrument of *securitization* of an issue to gain control over it. By definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so:

And because the End of this Institution [the Leviathan, the Sovereign], is the Peace and Defense of them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Sovereignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defense; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same.²²

Thus, that those who administer this order can easily use it for specific, self-serving purposes is something that cannot easily be avoided.

What then *is* security? With the help of language theory, we can regard "security" as a *speech act* . In

this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship).²³ By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.²⁴

The clearest illustration of this phenomenon--on which I will elaborate below--occurred in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, where "order" was clearly, systematically, and institutionally linked to the survival of the system and its elites. Thinking about change in East-West relations and/or in Eastern Europe throughout this period meant, therefore, trying to bring about change without generating a "securitization" response by elites, which would have provided the pretext for acting against those who had overstepped the boundaries of the permitted.

Consequently, to ensure that this mechanism would not be triggered, actors had to keep their challenges below a certain threshold and/or through the political process--whether national or international--have the threshold negotiated upward. As Egbert Jahn put it, the task was to turn threats into challenges; to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to one where they could be handled by ordinary means, as politics, economy, culture, and so on. As part of this exercise, a crucial political and theoretical issue became the definition of "intervention" or "interference in domestic affairs," whereby change-oriented agents tried, through international law, diplomacy, and various kinds of politics, to raise the threshold and make more interaction possible.

Through this process, two things became very clear. First, the *word* "security" is the *act*; the utterance is the primary reality. Second, the most radical and transformational perspective--which nonetheless remained realist--was one of minimizing "security" by narrowing the field to which the security act was applied (as with the European *détente* policies of the 1970s and 1980s). After a certain point, the process took a different form and the aim became to create a speech act *failure* (as in Eastern Europe in 1989). Thus, the trick was and is to move from a positive to a negative meaning: Security *is* the conservative mechanism--but we want less security!

Under the circumstances then existing in Eastern Europe, the power holders had among their instruments the speech act "security." The use of this speech act had the effect of raising a specific challenge to a principled level, thereby implying that all necessary means would be used to block that challenge. And, because such a threat would be defined as existential and a challenge to sovereignty, the state would not be limited in what it could or might do. Under these circumstances, a problem would become a *security* issue whenever so defined by the power holders. Unless or until this operation were to be brought to the point of failure--which nuclear conditions made rather difficult to imagine²⁵--available avenues of change would take the form of *negotiated limitations* on the use of the "speech act security." Improved conditions would, consequently, hinge on a process implying "less security, more politics!"

To put this point another way, *security* and *insecurity* do not constitute a binary opposition. "Security" signifies a situation marked by the presence of a security problem *and* some measure taken in response. Insecurity is a situation with a security problem and *no* response. Both conditions share the security problematique. When there is no security problem, we do not conceptualize our situation in terms of security; instead, security is simply an irrelevant concern. The statement, then, that security is always relative, and one never lives in complete security, has the additional meaning that, if one has such complete security, one does not label it "security." It therefore never appears. Consequently, transcending a security problem by politicizing it cannot happen *through* thematization in security terms, only *away*

from such terms.

An agenda of *minimizing* security in this sense cannot be based on a classical critical approach to security, whereby the concept is critiqued and then thrown away or redefined according to the wishes of the analyst. The essential operation can only be touched by faithfully working *with* the classical meaning of the concept and what is already inherent in it. The language game of security is, in other words, a *jus necessitatis* for threatened elites, and this it must remain.

Such an affirmative reading, not at all aimed at rejecting the concept, may be a more serious challenge to the established discourse than a critical one, for it recognizes that a conservative approach to security is an intrinsic element in the logic of both our national and international political organizing principles. By taking seriously this "unfounded" concept of security, it is possible to raise a new agenda of security and politics. This further implies moving from a positive to a negative agenda, in the sense that the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization can never be captured so long as we proceed along the normal critical track that assumes security to be a positive value to be maximized.

That elites frequently present their interests in "national security" dress is, of course, often pointed out by observers, usually accompanied by a denial of elites' right to do so. Their actions are then labelled something else, for example, "class interests," which seems to imply that authentic security is, somehow, definable independent of elites, by direct reference to the "people." This is, in a word, wrong. All such attempts to define people's "objective interests" have failed. Security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites. All of this can be analyzed, if we simply give up the assumption that security is, necessarily, a *positive* phenomenon.

Critics normally address the *what* or *who* that threatens, or the *whom* to be secured; they never ask whether a phenomenon *should* be treated in terms of security because they do not look into "securityness" as such, asking what is particular to security, in contrast to non-security, modes of dealing with particular issues. By working with the assumption that security is a goal to be maximized, critics eliminate other, potentially more useful ways of conceptualizing the problems being addressed. This is, as I suggested above, because security:insecurity are not binary opposites. As soon as a more nominalist approach is adapted, the absurdity of working toward maximizing "security" becomes clear.

Viewing the security debate at present, one often gets the impression of the object playing around with the subjects, the field toying with the researchers. The problematique itself locks people into talking in terms of "security," and this reinforces the hold of security on our thinking, even if our approach is a critical one. We do not find much work aimed at *de-securitizing* politics which, I suspect, would be more effective than securitizing problems.

Securitization and De-securitization: Four Cases

From the discussion above, it follows that a major focus of "security studies" should be the *processes* of securitization and de-securitization: When, why and how elites label issues and developments as "security" problems; when, why and how they succeed and fail in such endeavors; what attempts are made by other groups to put securitization on the agenda; and whether we can point to efforts to keep issues *off* the security agenda, or even to de-securitize issues that have become securitized?

Below, I explore these questions in the context of four different security agendas. First, I look at European security between 1960 and 1990, the period of change and *détente*, which provided the

framework for developing the speech act interpretation of security. During this period, the main issue was whether political and social change could be de-securitized even as the basic political structure of the region was kept frozen with major help of the security instrument. How much could be de-securitized and how was a major question, as is why and how change suddenly took on a new and different character in 1989. In the second part, I deal with a very different case: Environmental security. Here we see not an instance of de-securitizing an essentially securitized field but, rather, the potential advantages and disadvantages of securitizing a new area that, perhaps, should be addressed via other thematizations. In the third part, I take up the issue of societal security. This topic is presented in a fashion somewhat parallel to the preceding one, but I also ask the following: *If* we start using the concept of societal security in order to understand certain new dynamics, especially in post-Cold War Europe, what differences are there between a traditional, alternative security approach as opposed to a speech act approach to security? In the final part, I analyze the major new attempts to apply the concept of "security" in Europe, with particular reference to the notion of "European security."

Change and Détente: European Security 1960-1990

A peculiar feature of the Cold War system in Europe was the almost total exclusion of unwanted change, a guaranteed stability of the status quo. Raymond Aron once described it as a "slowdown of history" (but then went on to discuss the iron law of change that would ultimately upset this strange situation).²⁶ Security became the means whereby this slowdown was effected. The speech act "security" is, of course, more than just a word, since one must have in hand the means to block a development deemed threatening. For example, if a foreign army walks across the border or tries to intimidate a country, it is necessary (but not sufficient) to have adequate military strength to resist; or if social unrest, caused from within or without, is the problem, one must have a sufficiently repressive apparatus, ideological cohesion in the core group that allows the apparatus to be mobilized, and the legitimacy to use it that avoids the escalation of public opposition.

For a long time the situation in Central and Eastern Europe was such that, where nonmilitary issues were concerned, it was always possible for the regime to control things--*in extremis*, with the help of friends with tanks. In Cold War Europe, moreover, military threats could also be fenced off because of the general nuclear condition. As the late Franz Josef Strauss once put it: "In the present European situation there is no possibility of changes through war, but neither through revolution or civil war."²⁷ Change seemed impossible without some consent by the power-holders; it had to take place through a negotiated process of pressure and acceptance, stabilization and destabilization. And so it happened.

The central issue of the debates on European détente--and the mechanism that actually worked in them--was the *logic of change through stabilization*. In particular, as Willy Brandt explained, German *Ostpolitik* and *Deutschlandpolitik* were very explicit about the necessity of "stabilizing the status quo in order to overcome the status quo." Only by removing some threats to, and thereby some excuses for, the regimes in the East, would it then become possible to push back the securitization of East-West relations and change domestic conditions in Eastern Europe.

At the same time, the field of human rights evolved into an attempt to develop new *rules of the game* in the nonmilitary arena. "Human rights" became the label for a specific political struggle/negotiation over the border between security and politics, intervention and interaction. This theme generated a great deal of controversy in the mid-1980s, especially where efforts by West German Social Democrats (SPD) to revive détente were concerned.²⁸

Through all of this, East-West relations were marked by a basic asymmetry, because internal legitimacy made Western society much more stable. In Buzan's terms, states in the West were strong, in the East, weak.²⁹ This contrast generated a specific and clearly discernible constellation of security concepts and practices: Since the West could not be destabilized from within--especially as the decline of Eurocommunism eliminated this fear--security concerns became focused on the "high politics" of military threats and, possibly, skillful diplomatic maneuvering by the Soviets.³⁰ The states of the East, in contrast, were fearful of "threats" from below; they regarded almost all societal interaction with the West as potentially dangerous and destabilizing. Accordingly, the concept of security became highly militarized in the West, while in the East it was broadened to incorporate economic security and various types of interference in domestic affairs.

A key political question thus became the definition of "normal" transnational politics, as opposed to intervention, which was deemed to be a security problem. A great deal of the East-West dialogue of the 1970s and 1980s, especially that on "non-military aspects of security," human rights, and the whole Third basket of the Helsinki Accords, could be regarded as a discussion of where to place boundaries on a concept of security: To what degree were Eastern regimes "permitted" to use extraordinary instruments to limit societal East-West exchange and interaction?

By turning threats into challenges and security into politics, the détente-oriented actors of the West tried to get elites in the East to avoid applying the term "security" to issues and to open up domestic space for more open political struggle. Even though this strategy did not ultimately prove instrumental to the change in East-West relations in 1989, it is certainly arguable that it did play an important role in a process of softening that allowed another form of change to take place. Détente, as negotiated desecuritization and limitation of the use of the security speech act, contributed to the modification of the Eastern societies and systems that eventually made possible, via sudden desecuritization through a speech-act failure, the radical changes of 1989.

Many observers noted that the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe came about not as regimes slowly gave way to forces gaining more and more control from the periphery but, rather, as a collapse from the center. Some have tried to attribute this sudden loss of legitimacy to the dismal economic performances of the 1980s. This was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the collapse, inasmuch as the regimes had been lacking in legitimacy for a very long time. The new feature in 1989 was the loss of support *within* the elites, which some characterized as a sudden loss of self-confidence by the regimes themselves.³¹ In other words, to explain the change, we must look *within* elites, and the ways in which the question of legitimacy among elites translated into the capacity to act.³² An important part of an order-maintaining action occurs by sustaining a shared worldview within some minimum inner-circle. In earlier cases of adjusting course, when it was necessary to overcome a crisis or repress a revolt, the question of worldview did not arise. The old leader was sacrificed and the new one regained elite support by calling for the restoration of order. Something was said in this act, of course, but the decisive question was not the truth of the act, per se. Rather, the truth was given by the act being said from a specific position, thereby regenerating a loyal elite following, (re)installing the truth, and reimposing the center's will on the majority.³³ In this system of myth-making, there was an almost infinite capacity for reappraisal through auxiliary hypotheses. That capacity was not, however, infinite and it ultimately became more and more difficult to regenerate the truth, especially in the face of continued economic failures.³⁴ When the final crisis came, no one wanted to take on the task of "calling to order" and no one wanted to take the place at the center from which the call to order would come.

This inside-to-outside collapse can be seen as a speech act failure: The performance of the security act and reinstallation of truth suddenly failed to work. In retrospect, this should not have come as a surprise to the speech act analyst of European security, although it did. As I noted in early 1989 (without drawing the logical conclusion):

In a way, the most interesting about a speech act is that it might fail. And this is an essential part of its meaning. . . . In our context this is clearly the case: the invocation of "security" is only possible because it invokes the image of what would happen if it did not work. And not only this (. . .): the security speech act is only a problematic and thereby political move because it has a price. The securitizer is raising the stakes and investing some (real) risk of losing (general) sovereignty in order to fence of a specific challenge. In the present [post-structuralist] usage of speech act theory the *meaning* of the particular speech act is thus *equally* constituted by its possible success and its possible failure--one is not primary and the other derived.³⁵

As a result, the security mechanism, having lost its internal functioning, suddenly disappeared from the European scene and, for a time, it became extremely difficult to argue for any acts or policies in West or East by making reference to either national or European "security."

Subsequently, it became possible to discern some options for establishing a new European point of reference for security, especially around the process of German unification. A general feeling of mutual fear of losing control of the process led to mutual self-control, as each major actor tried to take into account the concerns of the others. Each developed surprisingly similar "blueprints,"³⁶ using the stability of Europe as the point of "self-evident" reference, and each of which demanded a certain degree of self-control called "security."³⁷ The core element of this need for self-control was the assumption (or fear) that German unification, and reactions to it, might become explosive.

With unification, internationally sanctioned through the "2 plus 4" agreement, in place, however, the urgency and focus of the situation was lost. Subsequently, the general theme of European security analysis and policy statements has focused on the unbearable openness of the situation. So much of the unexpected had taken place that no possible development could now be excluded. Moorings had been lost. Metaphors of architecture and insistent talk of institutions revealed a longing for fixity, for structures, for predictability. In this situation it was believed, moreover, no institutions should be terminated, even if they seemed no longer necessary; indeed, there emerged a widespread assumption that there existed a *deficit* of institutions and structures, and too much instability and unpredictability. The implicit agenda of "security" became, as a result, the closing off of options! I will discuss further attempts to establish "security" in Europe, below.

Environmental Security

In recent years, presentation of environmental degradation as a security problem has become increasingly common. Environmental activists are not the only ones to use this slogan; the security establishment seems to have become more receptive to the idea, as well. But does it make sense? I would argue "no," if we follow the logic laid out above.

During the 1980s, any idea about "nonmilitary aspects of security" was guaranteed to generate establishment suspicions. The following sequence of reasoning seemed, with some justification, threatening to security elites: (1) security is a broad concept and, therefore, many things are threatening in security terms; (2) in the light of a broader perspective, there exists a biased distribution of resources toward military concerns; and (3) this bias is relevant only for a limited portion of security threats as

defined in this broader sense.³⁸ Acquiescing to such a broadening, and admitting the biased allocation of resources, would quite obviously be seen by elites as a threat to their prerogatives in the security realm.

Following the events of 1989, however, security establishments began to embrace the idea of such alternatives as a means of maintaining their own societal relevance, as well as providing jobs to "security studies" and "strategic studies" analysts. For example, in late 1989, a special issue of *Survival*, the journal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which has always been a good indicator of mainstream, Western security thinking, addressed "Nonmilitary Aspects of Strategy." Articles in the journal addressed the panoply or possibilities of threats--economy, environment, migration, and drugs³⁹--in a search for new security problems to replace the old ones. Notions about environmental security also emerged at the political level, as when James Baker, Secretary of State in the Bush Administration, named environmental problems as "threats to the security of our citizens,"⁴⁰ and in the Brundtland Commission's report, *Our Common Future*, which used explicitly the concept of "environmental security."

Central to the arguments for the conceptual innovation of environmental or ecological security⁴¹ is its mobilization potential. As Buzan points out, the concept of national security "has an enormous power as an instrument of social and political mobilization" and, therefore, "the obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is the possible magnitude of the threats posed, and the need to mobilize urgent and unprecedented responses to them. The security label is a useful way both of signalling bias idanger and setting priority, and for this reason alone it is likely to persist in the environmental debates."⁴² Several analysts have, however, warned against securitization of the environmental issue for some of these very reasons, and some of the arguments I present here fit into the principled issue of securitization/desecuritization as discussed earlier in this chapter. A first argument against the environment as a security issue, mentioned, for example, by Buzan, is that environmental threats are generally unintentional.⁴³ This, by itself, does not make the threats any less *serious*, although it does take them out of the realm of *will*. As I pointed out earlier, the field of security is constituted around relationships between wills: It has been, conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert *its* will in defense of its sovereignty. The contest of concern, in other words, is among strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the logic around which the whole issue of security has been framed. In light of my earlier discussion, in which I stressed that "security" is not a reflection of our everyday sense of the word but, rather, a specific field with traditions, the jump to environmental security becomes much larger than might appear at first to be the case. I do not present this as an argument against the concept but, rather, as a way of illuminating or even explaining the debate over it.

Second in his critique of the notion of environmental security, Richard Moss points out that the concept of "security" tends to imply that *defense* from the problem is to be provided by the state:

The most serious consequence of thinking of global change and other environmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of centralized governmental responses by powerful and autonomous state organizations that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems. When one is reacting to the threat of organized external violence, military and intelligence institutions are empowered to take the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic, when responding to environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical. Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of addressing environmental problems, particularly those that have a global character.⁴⁴

Moss goes on to warn that "the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to global environmental problems."⁴⁵ It might, he points out, even lead to militarization of environmental problems.⁴⁶

A third warning, not unrelated to the previous two, is the tendency for the concept of security to produce thinking in terms of *us-them*, which could then be captured by the logic of nationalism. Dan Deudney writes that "the `nation' is not an empty vessel or blank slate waiting to be filled or scripted, but is instead profoundly linked to war and `us vs . them' thinking (. . .) Of course, taking the war and `us vs . them' thinking out of nationalism is a noble goal. But this may be like taking sex out of `rock and roll,' a project whose feasibility declines when one remembers that `rock and roll' was originally coined as a euphemism for sex."⁴⁷ The tendency toward "us vs . them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems.⁴⁸

Finally, there is the more political warning that the concept of security is basically defensive in nature, a status quo concept defending that which *is*, even though it does not necessarily deserve to be protected. In a paradoxical way, this politically conservative bias has also led to warnings by some that the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left," which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of environmental collectivism.⁴⁹ Certainly, there is some risk that the *logic* of ecology, with its religious potentials and references to holistic categories, survival and the linked significance of everything, might easily lend itself to totalitarian projects, where also the *science* of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in the name of the environment.⁵⁰

These observations point back toward a more general question: Is it a good idea to frame as many problems as possible in terms of security? Does not such a strategy present the negative prospect of, in a metaphorical sense, militarizing our thinking and seeing problems in terms of threat-vulnerability-defense, when there are good reasons for not treating them according to this formula?⁵¹ Use of the slogan "environmental security" is tempting, because it is an effective way of dramatizing environmental problems. In the longer run, however, the practices resulting from the slogan might lead to an inappropriate social construction of the environment, as a threat/defense problem. We might find it more constructive, instead, to thematize the problem in terms of an economy-ecology nexus, where decisions are actually interlinked.⁵²

Use of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem *is* a security problem, it is also a political choice, that is, a decision for conceptualization in a special way. When a problem is "securitized," the act tends to lead to specific ways of addressing it: Threat, defense, and often state-centered solutions. This, of course, leaves the environmental agenda, with its labelling problem, unresolved. One alternative is to view the emerging values of environmentalism as establishing their own moral basis. As his basis for optimism, for example, Buzan suggests that such values are already emerging as new norms of international society.⁵³ Deudney, more lyrically, talks about ecological awareness being linked to "a powerful set of values and symbols" that "draw upon basic human desires and aspirations," and argues that this, and not regressive security logic, should be the basis for mobilization.⁵⁴

Buzan, Moss and others who have analyzed the concept "environmental security," and its use, recommend that environmental problems be treated as part of the economic field. "The security label is

one solution," according to Buzan, but he tends to prefer the other path: To "identify environmental issues as part of the economic agenda," which has

the advantage of setting the issue at the heart of the action that is most relevant to it. There might, in the long run, be more advantage to making producers, consumers, taxmen and economists factor environmental costs into their accounting activities, than to arming the state with emergency powers derived from an analogy with war. It might be argued that process-type threats are better met by the process-type remedies of economics, than by the statist solutions of security logic.⁵⁵

Societal Security

Over the last few years, an interest in the concept of "societal security" has developed, especially in Europe. If the societal sector is securitized in an unsophisticated way, however, the result could be used to legitimize reactionary arguments for, on the one hand, defining immigrants and refugees as security problems and, on the other, presenting European integration as a national security threat. Conversely, "societal security" could end as an absurd attempt to tell people who feel insecure that they really should not.

More systematically, what does the term "societal security" suggest in light of the three perspectives I have so far discussed: Traditional state centric, critical wider security concepts, and the speech act approach? First, in the traditional state-centric perspective, "societal security" could come to mean making the state secure against *society*, against the types of situations in which a state might be destabilized as its society disintegrates or turns against it. For a society that lacks a state, or is a minority within a state, moreover, *its* strengthening could be seen by the state as such a security problem.

Second, the conventional-critical approach of broadening the concept of security is likely to become locked into debate about whether, for example, immigrants and refugees really do pose a security problem to the state. A discourse on societal security might then be captured by neo-nazis who argue "we are only defending *our* societal security," or end up as a pedagogical project trying to convince people that, although they feel threatened, there really is no security problem.

Finally, the approach I have proposed above points toward a study of the mechanisms leading to securitization of certain issues related to identity, especially when and how these problems are handled, *by society*, in security terms. Such an approach implies that we have to take seriously concerns about identity, but have also to study the specific and often problematic effects of their being framed as *security* issues. We also have to look at the possibilities of handling some of these problems in nonsecurity terms, that is, to take on the problems, but leave them unsecuritized. This latter approach recognizes that social processes are already under way whereby societies have begun to thematize *themselves* as security agents that are under threat. This process of social construction can be studied, and the security quality of the phenomenon understood, without thereby actually legitimizing it. With the "as much security as possible" approach, this is hard to handle: one will have either to denounce such issues as not being security phenomena ("misperceptions"), or one will be pulled into the process as co-securitizer.

What, then, can a term such as "societal security" mean? The security of societies is closely related to, but nonetheless distinct from, political security. Political security has to do with the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give governments and states their legitimacy. In today's world, the boundaries of state and society are rarely coterminous. The key to society, therefore, involves those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social

group. Society is about *identity*, the *self-conception* of communities, and those individuals who identify themselves as *members* of a particular community. "Society" should basically be conceived of as both *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, but thereby, to some degree, necessarily more than the sum of the parts (that is, not reducible to individuals).⁵⁶ Our analysis of societal security thus builds on a Durkheimian conception of society as a distinctive, *sui generis* phenomenon.⁵⁷

It has become fairly common to talk about various sectors (or the like) within the field of security, but the concept almost always poses the state as the *referent object*. This, I have suggested above, leads to "societal security" being understood as the security of a state vis-à-vis its constituent societies, which is not what we want. My colleagues and I have therefore suggested a reconceptualization of the security field in terms of a duality of *state* security and *societal* security. State security has *sovereignty* as its ultimate criterion, and societal security has *identity*. Both usages imply survival. A state that loses its sovereignty does not survive as a state; a society that loses its identity fears that it will no longer be able to live *as itself*.⁵⁸ There are, then, at the collective level between individual and totality, two organizing centers for the concept of security: state and society. At a secondary level, in the way portrayed in figure 3.1, there are also the "individual" and "international" levels, which influence national, or state, and societal security, as well (see figure 3.2).

The deeper cause of this emerging duality may well be a tendency toward the dissolution of the modern state system, as political authority is dispersed across multiple levels. This process begins to undermine the exclusive, sovereign, *territorial* state, as overlapping authorities begin to emerge.⁵⁹ In Europe, in particular, the coupling between state-nation is being weakened even in the absence of a new synthesis at the European level. No sovereign Euro-state will emerge any time soon but, at the same time, sovereign member states are beginning to lose some of their harder edges. This does not mean that nations will disappear, or even be weakened. The *territorial* state, however, with its principle of sovereignty, is being weakened. Left behind, we find nations with less state, cultures with less shell.

This development illuminates the increasing salience of "societal (in)security," that is, situations in which significant groups within a society feel threatened, feel their identity is endangered by immigration, integration, or cultural imperialism, and try to defend themselves. In the past, when a nation/culture felt itself threatened in these ways, it could call on "its" state to respond accordingly. This no longer seems possible, especially as border controls and various forms of economic policy move upward to the EU-European level. If such a development comes to be generally accepted, how are cultures to defend themselves? I would suggest that this will be done with culture. If one's identity seems threatened by internationalization or Europeanization, the answer is a strengthening of existing identities. In this sense, consequently, culture becomes security policy.




Figure 3.1 Modified hourglass model.

The case of Denmark is illuminating. During the past few years, viewers in Denmark have been treated to numerous television programs and seminars on "Danishness." These programs are not necessarily linked to an anti-European agenda or to the re-creation of a tight state-nation correspondence; rather, they represent a correlate of *acceptance* of integration into the European Union. It is the future and form of a Danish "non-state" nation within the EU that is at issue in the Danish EU-debate, and it has been the *cultural community* that has taken the first approach to these new themes, almost explicitly in terms of "cultural" security policy.

Several important questions regarding future developments in Europe follow from this example: First, will national identifications generally wane? Second, if they do not, in which of two possible directions will developments in cultural identity move? It is, on the one hand, possible that national identities might be revived in terms of non-state, cultural self-defense. This would help to support Europeanization of political structures, through the evolution of a European *political* identity, while leaving cultural identity at the national level (*Kulturnation* without *Staatnation*) On the other hand, it is also possible that cultural identity could be revived in the form of classical nation-state thinking, with classical concerns for state sovereignty, national autonomy, and self-expression at the cultural *and* political levels. Either might happen, although the former is the novel, challenging pattern.

With the process of European integration and the "culturalization" of nations proceeding, we can definitely see the emergence of societal security as something apart from state security. The state defends itself against threats to sovereignty and society defends itself against threats to identity. This dualism is not symmetrical. Society could, under some circumstances, choose to call upon the state for defense and collapse itself back into the old constellation. The integration scenario relates to a perspective whereby state security and societal security are increasingly differentiated as separate fields, each having a distinct referent object. If societies continue to take care of *their* security in *their* own way, this process of differentiation could continue. If, however, security concerns on the societal side escalate to the point of calling the state back in, we could see a retreat away from integration and back toward a Europe of distinct nation-states. So far, we have not elevated state and society to equal status but, rather, to separate status as referent objects of security. The long term importance of societal security in Europe is contingent on continuation of the process of integration, but the success of integration is also dependent on the separate security strategies of societies as distinct from those of the states.⁶⁰

This brief summary shows how the concept of societal security could be used to capture the essential dynamics of European security. The concept is not, however, unproblematic. Analytically, as well as politically, it raises several thorny questions. One is that of voice: How does a society speak? Society is different from the state in that it does not have institutions of formal representation. Anyone can speak on behalf of society and claim that a security problem has appeared. Under what circumstances should such claims be taken seriously?

In thinking about this question, it is important to avoid notions of an undifferentiated society. In practical terms, it is not a society itself that speaks but, rather, institutions or actors in society. Normally and traditionally, according to liberal contract ideology, it is the state that has spoken about security in the name of a presumed homogeneous, amorphous society that it allegedly represents, with what is assumed to be a clear focus and voice. The notion of "societal security" might strongly imply that this homogeneous, amorphous society now speaks on its own behalf. But societies are, of course, highly differentiated, full of hierarchies and institutions, with some better placed than others to speak on behalf of "their" societies. But "society" never speaks, it is only there to be spoken for.

While such representations are made all the time--indeed, a large part of politics is about speaking in the name of society⁶¹--there is a difference between normal politics and speaking "security" in the name of society. We cannot predict who will voice "societal security" concerns; we can only see, with hindsight, how much legitimacy an actor *did* possess when s/he tried to speak on behalf of society. Various actors try this all the time, but the attempt becomes consequential on a different scale when society more or less actively backs up the groups speaking. This has sometimes been the case with neo-nazis in Germany, in contrast to ultra-leftist terrorist acts committed in the name of the people but without much, if any, public support.

Most often, there are no generally legitimized, uncontested representatives of society: There is the state or there is nothing.⁶² This does not, of course, prevent groups from speaking on behalf of society and gaining some degree of backing for some period of time. Only in rare situations, as during the "Velvet Revolution" in Czechoslovakia, do we see moments--almost seconds--of a kind of self-evident representation of "society" by some nonelected but generally accepted institution such as Civic Forum. It is much more common for a societal "voice" to be controversial and only partly accepted. Normally, the state has preempted or prevented societal actors from taking on this function,⁶³ but this is no longer necessarily the case, especially in the complex constellations evolving in Western Europe. There, we could begin to see a growing division of labor between state and society, as societal voices establish themselves as defenders of certain proclaimed identities, while the state continues to pursue the separate agenda of defending its sovereignty.

It is easy to envision potentially troubling effects if certain societal issues, such as migration, are securitized. Elizabeth Ferris illustrates how this has already happened in Europe, with the result that the previously dominant framings of immigration as a humanitarian or domestic economic issue are being crowded out by notions of security threats.⁶⁴ Dan Smith suggests that "if security policy is justified on essentially racist grounds, that will feed back to strengthen racist currents in society."⁶⁵

Where Europeanization is concerned--if one favors European integration--it may be more advantageous to have such issues securitized in terms of *societal* security rather than state security. If, on the one hand, the "threat" from a new overarching identity is countered through a strengthening of state control over borders, the result will be to block integration and accelerate a renationalization of policies. If, on the

other hand, the challenge is taken on by society as something it should deal with *as the state is partly lifted to the European level*, a process of cultural "rearmament" of the nation may be compatible with political integration into Europe.

European Security After the Cold War

As suggested above in my discussion of European security during the Cold War, we could distinguish some tendencies toward installing new political limits by reference to European stability during 1989 and 1990 (especially in relation to the "German problem"). At that time, the risk was that the whole system might have become limitless, with the process falling to the hard realities of either external, superpower limits or the limits of national differentiation within Europe. The definition of European security would then have drifted until one of the major powers felt that overall developments had become intolerable. At that time, however, European thinking about security existed only in terms of *positive* programs, of increasing security for Europe. The result was various competing projects for Europe, each with a particular content that negated the other.⁶⁶ A purely negative limitation "for the sake of Europe" would not be more objective, but it would contain the possibility of being generalized. Without a new point of self-evidence, of a non-arguable reference point, it was feared by some that the system could end up testing the hard limits.

For more than forty years, "security" was the means for enforcing cohesion within the two halves of Europe. In the Western half, it defined the limits of loyalty/seriousness in relation to NATO, thereby regulating the state-to-state arrangement of the West. In the Eastern part, security was used to control domestic developments. After 1989, both of these functions were weakened, primarily and first in the East. "Security" then became the name for a possible handling of *Europe*, although, even today, this limit-defining function has not yet found a stable form. A good part of European politics since 1989 can thus be interpreted as attempts by "Europeans" to install a mechanism for disciplining each other and themselves, thereby reducing options.

The word-pair *European security* is an old one, but this should not lead us to overlook the important change in its meaning that took place during the 1980s. In 1987, Egbert Jahn pointed out that the term could have two very different meanings: *regional international security* or *Euronational security*.⁶⁷ Prior to that time, the term "European security" had, more often than not, meant something closer to the former, because in no meaningful way could one refer to the security of *Europe* except in the sense of the region being secure because a high proportion of its constituent security actors felt secure. Gradually during the 1980s, and in a much accelerated fashion after 1989, Europe as a whole became a referent object of security, and the second use of the term began to acquire greater salience. In some ways, the growing acceptance of this usage is paradoxical. With a referent object that is hardly constituted in political terms, and certainly not in institutional ones (except for largely administrative purposes), what can security discourse address? What is it that threatens Europe?

Balkanization is one possibility. James Der Derian has pointed out that the concept of Balkanization is a central one vis-à-vis Europe, and yet it is academically ignored: "Balkanization is generally understood to be the break-up of larger political units into smaller, mutually hostile states which are exploited or manipulated by more powerful neighbours."⁶⁸ Der Derian points out that, in the interwar years, competing users of the Balkanization slogan "shared epistemologies based on a closed structure of binary oppositions: for the Marxists, balkanization or federation, barbarism or socialism, nationalism or internationalism; for the Wilsonians, balkanization or confederation, despotism or liberal

constitutionalism, nationalism or cosmopolitanism."⁶⁹

Balkanization is a tool for legitimizing an international order *without* a named enemy. A political/military order generally legitimizes itself through reference to an external threat (a method developed to perfection in the symmetry of the cold war). When order is not organized against a specific country, it must be based on a legitimizing principle that will help to define which specific developments are to be opposed (as was the case with the Concert of Europe, which stood against revolution and change in the status quo, and which calls to mind former President Bush's famous phrase about NATO being an alliance not against any particular country, but against the threat of uncertainty and instability). Using a metaphor of chaos and disintegration is a way of establishing order *as such* as an aim. Since 1990, the oft-used metaphor has been reinforced by events in the Balkans although, more recently, the use of the metaphor has diminished, as developments in post-Yugoslavia turned metaphor into painful reality.

Beneath the seeming agreement on the new dominant discourse, we actually find *two* major discourses about European security. First, there is the Bush argument that the new enemy is uncertainty, unpredictability, and instability. The chains of equivalence suggested here are:

<i>Balkanization</i>	<-----vs----->	<i>st ability</i> =
<i>change</i>	<-----vs----->	<i>continuit y</i> =
<i>EU/Franco-German defense cooperation</i>	<-----vs----->	NATO

Given these equations, the fear of Balkanization becomes an argument against any change whatsoever: stick with NATO and don't rock the boat, so to speak. Attempts to organize defense cooperation in Western Europe are seen as upsetting the status quo, leaning toward the side of war and destabilization. In EU-discourse, the logic is:

<i>fragmentation</i>	<-----vs----->	<i>in tegration</i> =
<i>Balkanization</i>	<-----vs----->	<i>st ability</i> =
<i>"Superpower"</i>	<-----vs----->	<i>EU responsibility</i> =
<i>influence</i>		<i>for security</i>

As indicated in the definition of Balkanization above, one traditional meaning implied that a region would be opened up to external influence; more important, however, is not just the focus on instability and change, but on *fragmentation* . This possibility, then, points to *integration* and centralization as the remedy.

Generally speaking, in EU-logic, the concept of integration is the master variable. Integration is itself considered a value,⁷⁰ and each specific option must demonstrate whether it will increase or decrease integration. More specifically, we can see in the literature on European security a symptomatic attempt to use neorealism (and/or American realist-federalizing logic of the *Federalist Papers*) to argue for the

stark choice between "fragmentation" and "integration."⁷¹ This strategy might be seen as the new disciplining move: "*Europeans! You really have only two options--do not try to chose any other, they will be impossible. Do you want fragmentation or integration, Balkanization/re-nationalization or European Union?*"

Integration is, thus, increasingly driven by the specter of fragmentation⁷² and, because the alternative is seen as inherently unacceptable, it becomes an aim in itself. Immediately following German unification, French President Mitterrand began to argue: We have to insist on the Europe of integration in order to avoid "the Europe of War."⁷³ "Security" thus became shorthand for the argument: We have to do everything to ensure that integration, and not fragmentation, is the outcome.

There is another interesting usage of security logic in the struggle over Europeanization. In several countries, the wider concept of security is being applied to the issue of *migration* as a strong pro-integration argument. While giving the Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture in 1991, Jacques Delors employed security as "an all embracing concept," and explicitly argued for further integration on this basis:

One thing leads to another. This has been a feature of the Community, which is constantly being taken into new areas. One of these new areas is closely linked to the overall concept of security. I am referring, of course, to the consequences of free movement for individuals and the need for joint action, or at the very least close co-ordination, to combat the various threats to personal security: organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism. . . . Political initiatives in this security-related area are another expression of solidarity, a *leitmotif* of the European pact. ⁷⁴

Here the *broad*, "progressive" concept of security is being exploited in order to build up the EU. With the fragmenting tendencies in Europe apparent since 1991--war in the Balkans; the ratification crisis over Maastricht; monetary turbulence--more classical security concerns have returned to dominate. The specter of new-old power rivalries becoming the future for the new-old continent is probably a main reason for security discourse increasingly concentrating on the integration/fragmentation theme.

Thus we see an emerging shared sense of what the agenda is about: Balkanization. If the code becomes strong enough, "security" will, once again, become a useful tool. Across the Atlantic, there are also two competing versions, but enough should be shared across the ocean to make it a politically empowered concept.⁷⁵ With the articulation of security as "European Security" then, we get a general strengthening of the image of disintegration *as such* as the threat.

In the *European* version of order/security, there is a statebuilding logic at play. Security is invoked in a sense that can be interpreted as a call to defend a not-yet-existing social order. Hobbesian anti-anarchy logic is being used at a level between the domestic and the international. "Security the speech act" is, at present, mainly a tool for "Europe." The separate units primarily engage in *societal security*. All of this could be seen as an indication that, at a deeper level, the Euro-state has arrived: *It* uses state security logic even as its constituent countries have begun to act as almost-stateless nations using the logic of societal security.

Security, Politics and Stability: Or Why We Might Want "Security" After All

I have focused here on the issues of *securitization* and *de-securitization*, trying to demonstrate the importance of moving a theme or issue into the field of security, and thereby framing it as a "security issue." Throughout this essay I have tried to show the advantage of a nominalist, process perspective on the question, where the focus is on the constitution of security phenomena. This, I argue, avoids turning security into a thing.

The point of my argument, however, is not that to speak "security" means simply to talk in a higher-pitched voice. It is slightly more complex than that: "security" is a specific move that entails consequences which involve risking oneself and offering a specific issue as a test case. Doing this may have a price and, in that sense, it could be regarded as a way to "raise the bet."⁷⁶ The concrete issue is made principled, thereby risking principles (and order), but potentially controlling the concrete. The game has a whole inner logic to it and, when approaching it from some specific field, one should remain aware of the effects of having an issue codified in the language of security.

In the current European situation, security has, in some sense, become the name of the management problem, of governance in an extremely unstructured universe. We do not yet know the units--they have yet to be constructed through the discourse on security; we do not know the issues, and the threats--they are to be defined in the discourse on security; we only know the form: security. It might sound strange to say that we do not yet know the issues and threats when war has taken on still more brutal forms in Yugoslavia, with the possibility of European and American intervention having been raised now and again, when migration is discussed as a threat throughout Europe, and when German neo-nazis have attacked asylum seekers on this basis. To be sure, we may be aware of *some* of the events and processes that are likely to be part of the new security universe, but these are not yet fully conceptualized, and we do not know *in what form* they are going to enter this new security "system."

The point I wish to make here is that there is a widely shared, implicit assumption that limits and stability must be produced to at least some minimum degree. Some point has to become the political equivalent of the *transcendental signifié*--a point which is its own referent, endowed with the instruments (security) for reproducing itself. The *way* in which the mechanism of security is then inscribed in the new Europe will be a major factor in forming Europe's political system(s).

From a more Nietzschean perspective, I should also mention that politics always involves an element of exclusion, in which one has to do violence to the inherent openness of situations, to impose a pattern--and one has not only to remember but also to forget selectively.⁷⁷ To act politically means to take responsibility for leaving an impact, for forcing things in one direction instead of another. Whether such an act is "good" or "bad" is not defined by any inner qualities of the act or its premises, but by its effects (which depend on the actions of others, interaction and, therefore, an element of coincidence). As Hannah Arendt pointed out, "Action reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance of the historian."⁷⁸ Acting politically can, consequently, never be risk-free, and "progressiveness" is never guaranteed by one's political or philosophical attitude. Theoretical practices, as well as any political ones, have to risk their own respectability and leave traces, letting posterity tell the story about the *meaning* of an act. Post-structuralists have usually been arguing that their project is about opening up, implicitly arguing that a situation was too closed, too self-reproducing. Politics is inherently about closing off options, about forcing the stream of history in particular directions.⁷⁹

In the present context, politics and responsibility can involve prevention and limitation and, at times, the tool of *securitization* may seem necessary. It is thus not impossible that a post-structuralist concerned

about risks of power rivalry and wars will end up supporting a (re)securitization of "Europe" through rhetorics such as that of integration/fragmentation. The purpose of this would be to impose limits, but it would have as a side-effect some elements of state-building linked to the EU project. This could therefore imply that *national communities* might have to engage in a certain degree of securitization of *identity questions* in order to handle the stress from Europeanization. Under such circumstances, there might emerge a complementarity between nations engaging in societal security and the new quasi-state engaging in "European security." Neither of these two moves are reflections of some objective "security" that is threatened; they are, instead, possible *speech acts*, moving issues into a security frame so as to achieve effects different from those that would ensue if handled in a nonsecurity mode.

Note 1: Ole Wæver "Security the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word," Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Working Paper no. 1989/19. Part of the sections entitled Security: "The Concept and the Word" and "From 'Alternative Security' to 'Security, the Speech Act'" as well as the subsection "Change and Détente: European Security 1960-1990" under "Securitization and De-securitization: Four Cases" are adapted (sometimes abbreviated, sometimes elaborated) from this working paper; the latter subsection, as well as the final one, "European Security After the Cold War," include ideas previously presented in the paper "The changing character of closing off optcontinuity: European Security Systems 1949, '69, '89, . . .," presented in the panel on 'European Change Revisited' at the annual conference of British International Studies Association, Canterbury, December 1989 and reprinted as Working Paper, 2/1990; the subsection "Societal Security" draws on my contributions to Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, and Morton Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993). [Back.](#)

Note 2: On the deconstructive strategy of such "post-structuralist realism," see Ole Wæver, "Tradition and Transgression: a post-Ashleyan position," in Nick Rengger and Mark Hoffman, eds., *Beyond the Interparadigm Debate* (Brighton, U.K.: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, forthcoming); Ole Wæver, "Beyond the 'beyond' of critical international theory," paper for the (B)ISA conference, London March-April 1989 (Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen, Working Paper 1989/1.) [Back.](#)

Note 3: See, e.g., Jan Øberg, *At Sikre Udvikling og Udvikle Sikkerhed* (Copenhagen: Vindrose, 1983); Egbert Jahn, Pierre Lemaitre and Ole Wæver, *European Security: Problems of Research on Non-Military Aspects* (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Papers of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1987); Barry Buzan *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991, 2nd ed.); Ole Wæver, Pierre Lemaitre & Elzbieta Tromer, eds., *European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond East-West Confrontation* (London: Macmillan, 1989). [Back.](#)

Note 4: Øberg, *At Sikre Udvikling*; see also Johan Galtung, "The Changing Interface Between Peace and Development in a Changing World," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* #2 (1980):145-49; Johan Galtung, "Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses," *Journal of Peace Research* 22, #2 (1985):141-58, see especially pp. 146f. [Back.](#)

Note 5: This discourse will probably only have a political role if it appears as part of a social movement (such as a peace movement) that presents the establishment with a wall of meaningless practice, i.e. if it appears as part of an external, upsetting activity which is shocking precisely because it is incomprehensible. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Ole Wæver "Moment of the Move: Politico-Linguistic Strategies of Western Peace Movements," paper presented at the twelfth annual

scientific meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Tel Aviv, June 18-22 (Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Working Paper no. 1989/13); and Ole Wæver "Politics of Movement: A Contribution to Political Theory in and on Peace Movements," in: K. Kodama and U. Vesa, eds., *Towards a Comparative Analysis of Peacemovements* (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth 1990), pp. 15-44. [Back.](#)

Note 6: Øberg, *At Sikre Udvikling* ; Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security* 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983): 129-53; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 162-77. [Back.](#)

Note 7: See Jahn, et.al., *European Security* , pp. 51-53. [Back.](#)

Note 8: Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-426; C. A. W. Manning, *The Nature of International Society* (London: London School of Economics, 1962); Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977); Ole Wæver, "International Society: The Grammar of Dialogue among States?," paper presented at ECPR workshop in Limerich, April 1992; Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). [Back.](#)

Note 9: "Most seriously, however, even if we admit that we are all now participating in common global structures, that we are all rendered increasingly vulnerable to processes that are planetary in scale, and that our most parochial activities are shaped by forces that encompass the world and not just particular states, it is far from clear what such an admission implies for the way we organize ourselves politically. The state is a political category in a way that the world, or the globe, or the planet, or humanity is not. The security of states is something we can comprehend in political terms in a way that, at the moment, world security can not be understood." R. B. J. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics," *Alternatives* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5. There is nothing inevitable about this way of defining security--it has emerged historically, and might change gradually again--but one has to admit "the extent to which the meaning of security is tied to historically specific forms of political community" (Walker, "Security, Sovereignty"). Only to the extent that other forms of political community begin to become *thinkable* (again), does it make sense to think about *security* at other levels. The main process at the present is a very open and contradictory articulation of the relationship between state (and other political structures) and nation (and other large scale cultural communities). Therefore, the main dynamic of security will play at the interface of state security and societal security (in the sense of the security of large-scale we-identities). Thus, in the section on "Societal Security," I will argue why the study of "societal security" should--although being aware of specific threats to social groups--construct the concept of societal security as distinct from this, as being at a specific level of collectivity, being a social fact. [Back.](#)

Note 10: But even here one can argue about the way of defining these standard cases as military or political; Jahn, et. al., *European Security* , pp. 17-20. [Back.](#)

Note 11: Barry Buzan argues more extensively as follows: "Because the use of force can wreak major undesired changes very swiftly, military threats are traditionally accorded the highest priority in national security concerns. Military action can wreck the work of centuries in all other sectors. Difficult accomplishments in politics, art, industry, culture and all human activities can be undone by the use of

force. Human achievements, in other words, can be threatened in terms other than those in which they were created, and the need to prevent such threats from being realized is a major underpinning of the state's military protection function. A defeated society is totally vulnerable to the conqueror's power which can be applied to ends ranging from restructuring the government, through pillage and rape, to massacre of the population and resettlement of the land. The threat of force thus stimulates not only a powerful concern to protect the socio-political heritage of the state, but also a sense of outrage at the use of unfair forms of competition." *People, States and Fear* , p. 117. [Back](#).

Note 12: Jahn, et. al., *European Security* , p. 9. [Back](#).

Note 13: Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150. [Back](#).

Note 14: Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Politics* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 72f and 598f. [Back](#).

Note 15: This is the reason why small states will often be careful *not* to designate "inconveniences" as security problems or infringements on sovereignty--if they are, in any event, unable to do anything about it. One example was Finland in relation to the Soviet Union. [Back](#).

Note 16: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "On Social Contract or Principles of Political Right" [1762], (translated by Julia Conaway Bondanella) pp. 84-174 in: Alan Ritter and Julia Conaway Bondanella, eds., *Rousseau's Political Writings* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), p. 90. [Back](#).

Note 17: This essential argument--the repetition of war in nonmilitary form--is the basic difference between mine and the one made by some advocates of "non-offensive defense," most notably Anders Boserup and Poul Holm Andreassen (from whom I have learned this interpretation of Clausewitz). The ultimate test can arise in another sphere today, and the whole game therefore continues. Anders Boserup deduced from the nuclear condition an impossibility of Clausewitzian war, and from this a host of other far-reaching (political as well as theoretical) conclusions. These strong political conclusions, however, depend on a conceptualization of security (existential threats to sovereignty) as by necessity military. Elsewhere, I have criticised Egon Bahr's use of this operation and his way of thereby establishing political necessity from a military analysis; Ole Wæver "Ideologies of Stabilization--Stabilization of Ideologies: Reading German Social Democrats," in: V. Harle and P. Sivonen, eds., *Europe in Transition: Politics and Nuclear Strategy* (London: Frances Pinter, 1989), pp. 110-39. Still, the analysis presented here owes very much to the impressive and original Clausewitz interpretation of Anders Boserup. [Back](#).

Note 18: Anders Boserup, "Staten, samfundet og krigen hos Clausewitz," in: Carl von Clausewitz, *Om Krig, bind III: kommentarer og registre* (Copenhagen: Rhodos, 1986), pp. 911-930. [Back](#).

Note 19: Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* [originally published 1832], (Frankfurt: Ullstein Materialien, 1980), p. 19--Book I, Chapter 1. I follow here J. J. Graham's translation in *On War* , edited with an introduction by Anatol Rapoport (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1985), p. 103. [Back](#).

Note 20: Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* Book I, chapter 1, p. 17; *On War* , p. 101. [Back](#).

Note 21: Aron, *Peace and War* , p.21. [Back](#).

Note 22: Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Middlesex: Pelican Books, 1968 [1651]), pp. 232f. [Back](#).

Note 23: More precisely, in the theory of speech acts, "security" would be seen as an *illocutionary* act; this is elaborated at length in my "Security, the Speech Act." See also: J. L. Austin, *How to do Things with Words* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, 2nd ed.), pp. 98ff. [Back](#).

Note 24: A point to which we will return: The other side of the move will, in most cases, be at least the price of some loss of prestige as a result of needing to use this special resort ("National security was threatened") or, in the case of failure, the act backfires and raises questions about the viability and reputation of the regime. In this sense the move is similar to raising a bet--staking more on the specific issue, giving it principled importance and thereby investing it with basic order questions. [Back](#).

Note 25: The strongest case for the theoretical status of speech act failure being equal to success is given by Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," *Glyph* 1 (1977): 172-197 (originally presented in 1971). The article was reprinted, in a different translation, in Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). [Back](#).

Note 26: Raymond Aron, *On War: Atomic Weapons and Global Diplomacy* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1958 [French original 1957]), pp. 80-102. [Back](#).

Note 27: Rudolf Horst Brocke, *Deutschlandpolitische Positionen der Bundestagsparteien--Synopsis* (Erlangen: Deutsche Gesellschaft für zeitgeschichtliche Fragen, 1985), pp. 66f and 79f. [Back](#).

Note 28: Wilfried von Bredow and Rudolf Horst Brocke, *Das deutschlandpolitische Konzept der SPD* (Erlangen: Deutsche Gesellschaft für zeitgeschichtliche Fragen, 1986); Ole Wæver "Ideologies of Stabilization"; and Ole Wæver, "Conceptions of Détente and Change: Some Non-military Aspects of Security Thinking in the FRG," pp. 186-224, in: Wæver, et. al., *European Polyphony* . [Back](#).

Note 29: Weak/strong *states* refer (in contrast to weak/strong powers) to the political strength of the state; how much state the state is, which means basically the degree of sociopolitical cohesion--not least how well the fit between state and nation is. Weak/strong *powers* then cover the more traditional concern about the "power" of a unit (as its ability to influence other units). See Buzan *People, States and Fear* , pp. 96-107, 113f and 154-58. [Back](#).

Note 30: Ole Wæver, "Conflicts of Vision--Visions of Conflict," pp. 283-325 in: Wæver, et. al., *European Polyphony* . [Back](#).

Note 31: See, e.g., Theodore Draper, "A New History of the Velvet Revolution," *New York Review of Books* , Jan. 14, 28, 1993 (in two parts). [Back](#).

Note 32: Ole Wæver, "The Changing Character of Continuity." [Back](#).

Note 33: See Jadwiga Staniszkis, "The Dynamics of a Breakthrough in the Socialist System: An Outline of Problems," *Soviet Studies* 41, no. 4 (1989): 560-73; Jadwiga Staniszkis, *The Ontology of Socialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). [Back](#).

Note 34: To this might be added the interpretations of "conversion of power," that is, the way the old elite transformed its old system power into new capitalist "power"--and therefore did not *need* to oppose change as strongly as one would have expected. See Staniszkis, "Dynamics"; Elemér Hankiss, *East*

European Alternatives: Are There Any? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Ole Wæver, "The Changing Character of Continuity," pp. 11ff. [Back](#).

Note 35: Ole Wæver, "Security the Speech Act," pp. 45f.--making reference to the argument of Derrida, "Signature Event Context." [Back](#).

Note 36: Ole Wæver, "Three Competing Europes: German, French, Russian," *International Affairs* 66, no. 3 (July 1990): 477-493; especially pp. 486-88. [Back](#).

Note 37: Ole Wæver, "The Changing Character of Continuity," pp. 20f. [Back](#).

Note 38: Alternatively, but not much better (in the eyes of the security establishment), a slogan of "non-military aspects of security" could point toward the "Eastern" argument for economic and political security and thereby for legitimizing a concern for system stability beyond the field of military threats (cf. the preceding section). [Back](#).

Note 39: The articles were: Robert D. Hormats, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace--1989"; Hans W. Maull, "Energy and Resources: The Strategic Dimension"; Neville Brown, "Climate, Ecology and International Security"; Michael J. Dziedzic, "The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security"; and Sam C. Sarkesian, "The Demographic Component." [Back](#).

Note 40: Secretary Baker, "Diplomacy for the Environment," address before the National Governors' Association, February 26, 1990, Washington D.C. (reprinted in *Current Policy*, No. 1254, February 1990), quoted in Richard H. Moss, "Environmental Security? The illogic of centralized state responses to environmental threats," in: Paul Painchaud, ed., *Geopolitical Perspectives on Environmental Security* (Cahier du GERPE, No. 92-05, Université Laval, Quebec). [Back](#).

Note 41: This is one of the five sectors discussed by Buzan in *People, States and Fear*, pp. 131-33. [Back](#).

Note 42: Barry Buzan, "Environment as a Security Issue," in: Paul Painchaud, ed., *Geopolitical Perspectives on Environmental Security* (Cahier du GERPE, No. 92-05, Université Laval, Quebec), pp. 1 and 24f. [Back](#).

Note 43: Buzan, "Environment as a Security Issue," p. 15. [Back](#).

Note 44: Moss, "Environmental Security?," p. 24. [Back](#).

Note 45: Moss, "Environmental Security?," p. 32. [Back](#).

Note 46: Moss quotes the Senate Armed Services Committee to the effect that protecting U.S. interests against environmental changes "may ultimately require the use of U.S. military power." See "Environmental Security?," p. 21. [Back](#).

Note 47: Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security," *Millennium* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1990): 461-76; here quoted from p. 467. [Back](#).

Note 48: Moss, "Environmental Security?," p. 32. [Back](#).

Note 49: Buzan, "Environment as a Security issue," p. 24. [Back.](#)

Note 50: This was what led André Gorz some years ago to the conclusion that the *way* we addressed environmental issues (which he certainly cared about too) contained the danger of "eco-fascism." See André Gorz, *Ecologie et liberte* (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1977). See also Charles T. Rubin, *The Green Crusade* (New York: Free Press, 1994). [Back.](#)

Note 51: Anders Boserup, presentation on the concept of security, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen, 1985. [Back.](#)

Note 52: Buzan, "Environment as a Security Issue." [Back.](#)

Note 53: Buzan, "Environment as a Security Issue," p. 26. [Back.](#)

Note 54: Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation . . . ," p. 469. [Back.](#)

Note 55: Buzan, "Environment as a Security Issue," p. 25; see pp. 16-19 about the economic approach. [Back.](#)

Note 56: This issue of the nature of society (and individuals) is a debate often replayed under various headings such as methodological individualism versus methodological collectivism, or more fashionably these past few years as liberalism versus communitarianism; see, for example, Tracy B. Strong, ed., *The Self and the Political Order* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); and Quentin Skinner, "On Justice, the Common Good and the Priority of Liberty," pp. 211-24 in: Chantal Mouffe, ed., *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community* (London: Verso, 1992). Finally, there is a point in criticizing dichotomies like the *Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft* one, inasmuch as it obscures the important political arena of practices that are neither openly addressed nor a necessary expression of the "soul" of a community but transferred in the form of "practical knowledge." See Richard K. Ashley, "Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematic of Governance," pp. 251-90, in: E.-O. Czempiel and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); and Ole Wæver, "International Society: the Grammar. . . ." Finally, it could be argued that this debate ought to be displaced toward "the respective *constitution* of the individual (the `self') and the polity (the `order')," as argued by Tracy Strong, *The Self*, p. 3. [Back.](#)

Note 57: The insecurity of social groups could affect the stability and security of society as a kind of insecurity from below: The insecurity of social groups might spread to whole societies and into other sectors. Thus, "societal security" entails an interest in security at all lower levels. It seems, however, not advisable to *define* the sum of these smaller securities *as* societal security, inasmuch as this would lead us down the track toward an atomistic, aggregate view of security, where the ultimate question is individual (= global) security. Opening up the definition of societal security *as* the security of various groups would (beyond probably proving to be an infinite expansion of the subject) lead in the direction of an aggregate conception of the constituent collectivities. As with state security, societal security has to be understood first of all as the security of a social agent which has an independent reality and which is more than and different from the sum of its individuals. Approaching it by way of summing up, aggregating individual preferences, one will never capture the nature of *its* security problems which are constituted in the relationship of a state and its environment and a society and its environment. In the case of societal security, it is actually the case that societies are often made insecure because important groups in society feel insecure. This, however, has to be kept conceptually separate from the security of a

society, societal security. Societal security is not *social* security. The referent object for societal security is society as such, neither the state, nor the (sum of the) individuals. [Back](#).

Note 58: The logic of security points to questions of survival but, of course, the rhetoric of security will often be employed in cases where survival--that is, sovereignty or identity--is *not* actually threatened, but in which it is possible to legitimate political action by making reference to such a threat. State security can be influenced by the (in)security of a society on which it is based, but this has to be seen as a two-step procedure. In the case of real "nation states", there will be small difference between the pure state definition and the new more complex one of state security via societal security. When nation and state do not coincide, however, the security of a state-challenging nation will often increase the insecurity of the state. More precisely, if the state has a homogenizing "national" program, its security will by definition be in conflict with the *societal security* of "national" projects of subcommunities inside the state. [Back](#).

Note 59: This can be analyzed in terms of a "new middle ages." The medieval metaphor has the advantage of drawing our attention to the change in the organizing principle of the *sovereign, territorial state*, and not the *nation-state* (which is only half as old). The national idea is obviously not dying out (nor is politics as such giving way to interdependence or technocratic administration as often implied in ideas of "end of the nation-state"); what is modified is the *organization of political space*. For some four centuries, political space was organized through the principle of territorially defined units with exclusive rights inside, and a special kind of relations on the outside: International relations, foreign policy, without any superior authority. There is no longer one level that is clearly *the* most important to refer to but, rather, a set of overlapping authorities. Consequently, even those nations most closely approaching the ideal type of the nation-state are beginning to lose the option of referring always to "their" state.

In a historical perspective, therefore, the state-nation relationship is moving toward an unprecedented situation. The nation, born into an interstate system based on the sovereign state (already 200-300 years old at the time), might continue into a post-sovereignty situation. Thus, the post-modern political system will *not* be totally like the Middle Ages in this important sense. The understanding of this complex evolution is often blocked by the use of the term "nation-state" as designating both the emergence of the national idea and the twice as old territorial state (i.e. the principle of territoriality, sovereignty, and exclusivity), which means that the specific nature and importance of the latter concept (which is the basic system organizing principle) is overlooked. This obscures an understanding of the importance of a possible change at this level. Announcements of the demise of the nation-state are often refuted by pointing to the continuing importance of nationalism/the nation idea, but this misses the point since the major change seems to happen at the level of *the state* (which of course implies that the nation-state as we have known it will also change since it was built on the territorial state), whereas *the nation* as such continues.

See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 254f, 264ff, 285f, and 291ff; James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) pp. 70 and 79ff; Timothy W. Luke, "The Discipline of Security Studies and the Codes of Containment: Learning from Kuwait," *Alternatives* 16, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 315-44, especially pp. 340f; Ole Wæver, "Territory, Authority and Identity: The late 20th Century emergence of Neo-Medieval Political Structures in Europe," paper for the 1st conference of EUPRA, European Peace Research Association, Florence, November 8-10, 1991. [Back](#).

Note 60: See Ole Wæver, et. al., *Identity, Migration and the new Security Agenda*, especially chapter 4; and Ole Wæver, "Insecurity and Identity Unlimited," in: Anne-Marie Le Gloannec & Kerry McNamara, eds., *The European Disorder*, forthcoming (Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen, Working Paper 1994/14). [Back](#).

Note 61: See, for example, Ernesto Laclau, *Thoughts on the Revolution of Our Times* (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 89-92. [Back](#).

Note 62: Probably we see here the reason why all this is more cryptic to Americans than to Europeans. At first, a concept of societal security should seem more natural to Anglo-Saxons who allegedly see state and society as separate, whereas the continental tradition is for state and society to be conceived as related; see Kenneth Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 192-95. The American tradition is, however, of a rather minimalist concept of state, in which the state is not given any inherent *raison d'être* in and of itself, but is only legitimated as derivative (in the form of *some* kind of social contract) and only when and if it serves--and defends--society. Continentals are more prone to grant the state its own right to existence, and continental traditions point to *society* as a collective, as more-than-the-sum-of-the-parts, which is more alien to anglo-liberal thought. Thus, in American thinking, "security" is implicitly assumed to be ultimately legitimized by reference to securing *individuals*. A concept of societal security then becomes odd (the natural reaction is to call for more correct and appropriate state policy), unless one denounces the social contract conception as simply liberal/American ideology. If one agrees with Thomas Paine that "What is government more than the management of the affairs of a nation? It is not," and further that sovereignty rests with the *nation*, which has always the right "to abolish any form of government if finds inconvenient and establish such as accords with its interests, its disposition and its happiness" (*Rights of Man*, pp. xx), then separate agendas of security for state and nation become inconceivable. To continental Europeans, the state, more than a pragmatic instrument for achieving the collective interests of a group of individuals, is seen as a unit with its own logic and concerns. So is society. [Back](#).

Note 63: Carl Schmitt even claimed that the task of the state was to define enemy and friend, and if the state failed to accomplish this, inevitably others would come forward and do so, whereby the state would lose its position and be replaced by the new power. Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1963 [1932]), especially pp. 45-54. [Back](#).

Note 64: Elizabeth G. Ferris, "Peace, Security and the Movement of People," unpublished paper, Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala, Sweden. [Back](#).

Note 65: Quoted by Ferris, p. 17. [Back](#).

Note 66: Wæver, "Three Competing Europes." [Back](#).

Note 67: Jahn, et. al., *European Security*, pp. 35-37. [Back](#).

Note 68: James Der Derian "S/N: International Theory, Balkanization, and the New World Order," *Millennium* 20, 3 (1991): 485-506, quote on p. 488; also in Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 141-169. [Back](#).

Note 69: Der Derian, "S/N," p. 491. [Back](#).

Note 70: Markus Jachtenfuchs and Michael Huber, "Institutional Learning in the European Community: The Response to the Greenhouse Effect," in: J. D. Lifferink, P. D. Lowe and A. P. J. Mol, eds., *European Integration and Environmental Policy* (London: Belknap, in press). [Back](#).

Note 71: This argument is all-pervasive in the European press and used by numerous politicians, including Kohl as well as Mitterrand. An intelligent policy analysis arguing strongly along these lines is supplied by Peter Glotz, "Europa am Scheideweg" *Europa Archiv* 47, no. 18 (September 25, 1992): 503-14. Attempts to ground this ideological analysis in (mainly neorealist) theory is found in: Buzan, et. al., *The European Security Order Recast*; Ole Wæver, "Sikkerhedspolitisk Stabilitet og National Identitet," pp. 101-61 in Christen Sorensen, ed., *Europa--Nation, Union: Efter Minsk og Maastricht* (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1992). [Back](#).

Note 72: Ole Wæver, "Modelli e scenari futuri," *Politica Internazionale* 21, no. 3 (gennaio-marzo 1993): 5-27; and Ole Wæver, "Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in E.U. Studies," *Journal of International Affairs* 48, no. 2 (1995). [Back](#).

Note 73: Press conference of the President, François Mitterrand, in East Berlin, December 22, 1989 (reprinted in *Europa Archiv* no. 4 (1990): D. 96-99). [Back](#).

Note 74: Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," *Survival* 33, no. 2 (March/April 1991): 99-109, quotation from p. 103. [Back](#).

Note 75: Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored*; Ole Wæver, "Three Competing Europes"; Ole Wæver, "International Society: Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled?" *Cooperation and Conflict* 27, no. 1 (1992): 147-178. [Back](#).

Note 76: With European security used in the fragmentation/integration way (as presented above), the price seems to be that Yugoslavia becomes the test case for "Europe." As a place to "prove" Europe, however, solving the problem of the Balkans is hardly the test one would choose. The unfortunate first case poses a risk to Yugoslavia as well as to the EU. As the EU has become pulled/tempted to jump into the conflict, it becomes an aim in itself to act. Moreover, the EU has been conducting its policy with the main criteria being the effect on the EU, not on Yugoslavia. See Ole Wæver, "Den europæiske union og organiseringen av sikkerheden i Europa," pp. 33-72, in: Martin Sæter et. al., *Karakteren av Den europeiske union* (NUPI-Report no. 160, July 1992, Oslo), especially pp. 64-66; Håkan Wiberg, "Divided States and Divided Nations as a Security Problem--the Case of Yugoslavia" (Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Working Paper no. 1992/14). [Back](#).

Note 77: This is probably most clearly argued in "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben," where Nietzsche says for instance that "all great things" depend on illusions in order to succeed (in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Werke* (Frankfurt/M: Ullstein 1969, vol. 1), p. 254). It further links up to the themes of "setting values" and "creating beyond oneself" from, for instance "Thus spoke Zarathustra," and the risk implied in "the will to power." See, for example, *Werke*, vol. 2, pp. 301, 356ff, 394f, 600, 730f, and 817-20; and Ole Wæver, "Tradition and Transgression" [Back](#).

Note 78: Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958), p. 192. [Back](#).

Note 79: If some reader were puzzled above to find the author referring to himself as an example of an

"ideological" and "disciplining" move, this was not (necessarily) a case of analytical schizophrenia but, rather, a conscious self-deconstruction. This points toward a tricky question about post-structuralism and politics. For understandable but contingent institutional reasons, post-structuralists have emerged on the academic scene with the political program of tearing down "givens," of opening up, making possible, freeing. This invites the reasonable question: opening up room for what? Neo-nazis? War? How can the post-structuralist be sure that "liberating minds" and "transcending limits" will necessarily lead to more peaceful conditions, unless one makes an incredible enlightenment-indebted "harmony of interests" assumption? For someone working in the negatively-driven field of security, a post-structuralist politics of responsibility must turn out differently, with more will to power and less de-naturalization. [Back](#).

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